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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 1997 the world witnessed an economic crisis in Asia that came as a 
surprise to many observers. Few had predicted that the apparently successful economies in the 
Asian region would suddenly experience severe problems in the late 1990s.1  The countries of the 
Asian region had for many years been very successful, and one had often heard expressions like 
‘look to Japan’ and ‘the East Asian miracle’, in relation to this region’s impressive economic 
growth. It was clear from the start that the economic crisis in 1997 had serious impacts on the 
states affected, both in terms of economic consequences and not at least in social costs. There 
were many attempts to explain the causes of the Asian economic crisis, and scholars disagreed 
about what went wrong. Quite a few blamed the crisis on the ‘Asian way’ of economic 
development and the tight relationship between the business sector and the state.2 Other 
commentators saw the globalised economy and international financial panic to be the main 
causes.3 What surprised me about this discussion was the seeming lack of concern for the 
domestic political aspects of the crisis management and the subsequent implementation of the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) economic and structural reforms.4 Many commentators 
have payed a great deal of attention to the macroeconomics of the reforms, while most scholars 
tend to ignore the political aspects of the crisis management and the following implementation of 
economic reforms.5 Few have commented on this particular aspect, and rather stressed political 
factors as causes to the crisis in using vague terms like ‘crony capitalism’, ‘weak political 
leadership’ and ‘autocratic governments’. 
1.1 The theme 
When one witnessed how differently the Asian governments responded to the crisis in terms of 
effectiveness, questions concerning domestic politics and the political institutional structures of 
these countries seem central. This observation is my point of departure, and I will in this thesis 
explore how national political factors influence governments’ implementation of IMF 
reforms. This thesis’ research design is build around how national political actors, like the 
bureaucracy, the presidency, and various social groups, can influence the implementation of IMF 
reforms. The question of how politics affect economic policy decision-making is a much-debated 
                                                 
1 Asian region is here defined as East Asia and South East Asia. Central and South Asia are excepted from this 
definition 
2 See, for example Rudolph & Arumugam 2000 and The Economist 1998 
3 See for example Wade & Venoroso 1998 and Radlet & Sachs 1998 
4 When I in the following refer to IMF’s economic reforms, it includes both structural and economic reforms  
5 There are mainly two books that have been concerned with the political economy of the Asian Crisis, see Haggard 
(2000) and T.J.Pempel (1999) 
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theme and there is an open discussion whether economic policy making can be separated from its 
political context. Following the strand of ‘political economy’, I seek to examine the interaction 
between economics and politics through focusing on the political processes in which decisions 
about economic policies are made. The underlying argument in this thesis is that the political and 
economic spheres are interwoven, and in order to understand the politics of reform 
implementation it is important to explore how political institutions and political processes 
promote a special kind of economic development (Törnquist 1999:14).  
 
1.1.2 Two cases: Indonesia and South Korea 
To be able to examine the issue of economic reform implementation better, I have chosen to 
explore the Indonesian and South Korean experiences in relation to the economic crisis in Asia in 
1997-98. I focus mainly on the initiation phase of the implementation process, that is to say the 
formulation and announcement of the IMF reforms and the management of the initial reactions to 
them. I have chosen to limit my thesis and will not discuss the further reform implementation 
process following Indonesia’s president Suharto’s step down from power on the 21st of May 
1998. With the shift of president, the Indonesian political landscape changed towards a more 
democratic political structure.6 I will compare my findings in the Indonesian case with the South 
Korean experience, because these two countries were affected by the same regional economic 
crisis, and both countries sought the assistance of the IMF. Nevertheless, Indonesia and South 
Korea stand out as two contrasting cases: Whereas the implementation of the IMF reforms in 
South Korea is normally seen to be the successful case, the Indonesian reform implementation is 
mostly generally perceived as a failure (Haggard 2000, MacIntyre 1999a). My aim is to explore 
how their different experiences with the implementation of IMF reforms can be explained in 
terms of their respective national political characteristics through discussing the following four 
relevant factors:(i) bureaucratic organization; (ii) features associated with the relationship 
between the government and the business sector; (iii) the possibility of decisive political action 
within the political-institutional framework; (iv) how popular support and interest articulation are 
incorporated into the national political institutional structure. It should be underlined that I do not 
seek to enter into the normative debate over the economic or social wisdom of the IMF reforms as 
such, nor is my aim to give a comprehensive account of the crisis itself and its causes. My task is 
                                                 
6 Stephan Haggard (2000) gives a thorough and detailed analysis of the further implementation of IMF reforms during 
the Habibie presidency from May 1998 until the end of 2000.   
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rather to examine empirically and analytically the politics of economic reform implementation in 
Indonesia and South Korea during the Asian economic crisis in 1997-98.   
 
1.2 The international context: How governments handle demands from the IMF to 
implement economic reforms 
This study of the implementation of the IMF reforms in Indonesia and South Korea is set in the 
framework of an economic crisis, where the two countries call upon the IMF for assistance in the 
form of emergency loans in managing their national economic crises. In this thesis the interplay 
between the IMF and the recipient governments represents the context in which the further 
implementation process within these two countries should be understood. Two important issues 
concerning this context must be discussed as they represent a premise for the following analysis 
of the relevant national political factors. First, a common dilemma for a country undergoing an 
IMF programme occurs when its government on the one hand seeks to recover from the crisis 
with the assistance of the IMF, and on the other hand has to deal with social, political and 
economic consequences of the required IMF reforms, consequences that may generate political 
and social instability. This dilemma becomes serious when the national government experiences 
that IMF has a fundamentally different economic ideological approach to the needed reforms 
(Kahler 1993). The second issue of importance in relation to the interaction between the IMF and 
the recipient government is how the Fund can engage in strategies that attempt to shape the 
incentives of their counterparts by influencing the national political level that surrounds an 
implementation process (ibid: 377).7 The IMF can undertake a campaign of persuasion within a 
government but also outside of the government to encourage the formation of a supportive 
domestic coalition or to shore up an existing one. These two issues, a recipient government’s 
dilemma of adhering to the IMF demands when they contradict with national considerations, and 
the transnational alliances between recipient country’s political actors and the IMF, are not rooted 
in any specific theoretical tradition, but they are important questions based on empirical 
experiences in relation to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (Nelson 1990, 
Kahler 1993).  
 
1.3 Theoretical approaches 
A number of different theories and empirical research focus on different aspects of the process of 
economic reform implementation in general, but none of them provide an overarching conceptual 
                                                 
7 The ‘Fund’ refers to the International Monetary Fund and will be used interchangeably with the term IMF.  
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scheme or theory.8 This lack of a general theory has led me to design this study around two 
different theoretical perspectives, or set of concepts, that focus on national political systems’ 
capacity to implement reforms. I will briefly introduce the two approaches, which will be 
discussed more thoroughly in chapter 2. The state capacity perspective is chosen in order to gain 
a better understanding of the technical and administrative capacity of states to formulate and 
implement reforms (Nelson 1990:18). Much of the argument on state capacity draws upon 
literature on the so-called ‘developmental state’, and two topics are important.9 First, the issue of 
state organization, where the focus is on a competent and autonomous bureaucracy that 
successfully implements policies (Evans 1995). Second, the idea that the ability of states to 
implement reforms is a result of a close relationship between the government and the business 
sector, where the former exercises a certain level of control in order to assist and to discipline the 
latter (Weiss 1998). In this thesis the issue of state capacity relates to (i) the expertise of the 
bureaucracy, and (ii) how the relationship between the government and the business sector can be 
organised in ways that indicate high or low administrative and technical capacity to implement 
reforms.  
 
The second theoretical approach chosen focuses on regime capacity, how certain political 
institutional structures can facilitate effective reform implementation. In this study I will use the 
theoretical approach of regime capacity to explore two important issues. First, how different 
regime types can be said to have varying regime capacity when it comes to implementing reforms 
(MacIntyre 1999a).10 Second, how state-society relations are incorporated in political institutional 
structures as to enhance or weaken regime capacity in reform implementation (Killick 1998). In 
this thesis the issue of regime capacity relates to (i) the possibility of decisive political action 
within the political-institutional framework, and (ii) how popular support and interest articulation 
are incorporated into the national political structure.  
                                                 
8 Robert Putnam (1988) describes how the national and international level of analysis can be combined as to better 
understand the bargaining process about the design of a structural adjustment program between a country and the IMF, 
and quite a few students have examined the issue of structural adjustment programs using Putnam’s theoretical 
approach. I have chosen not to do so, because his approach focuses on the bargaining process between the IMF and a 
specific country, which is not the issue under study in this thesis. Another factor that makes it difficult to use Putnam’s 
approach is that in his analysis an important actor is the person that conducts the negotiation between the recipient 
country and the IMF. Both in the cases of Indonesia and South Korea there were not much room for negotiations 
because the economic crisis was escalating, and the IMF programmes were more or less introduced without any 
bargaining between the two parties involved.  
9 The East Asian countries Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea were considered to be developmental states, 
where economic growth was seen as due to extensive intervention by the state in the national economy. I will elaborate 
further on characteristics and theories concerning the developmental state in part 2.1  
10 Political regime refers to how the political decision-making process is organized within a given territory. An obvious 
example is the distinction between a democracy and an authoritarian regime (Østerud et al. 1997:234).  
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The two suggested theoretical approaches are not seen as competitive explanations that I set out 
to test, but they are rather meant to complement each other as they focus on different political 
factors relevant to my analysis. To combine the two perspectives of state and regime capacity I 
will be able to explore ways that institutional design can facilitate or hinder effective reform 
implementation, while at the same time considering how regime capacity can influence economic 
policy management. Both perspectives draw upon the institutional approach in political science, 
where the focus is on the ‘formal and informal rules of enforcement mechanisms that influence 
the behaviour of organisations and individuals in society’ (Burki & Perry 1998).  
 
1.4 The analytical framework 
The issue of the politics of reform implementation is wide and intricate. However, the reason for 
writing this thesis is a wish to explore more thoroughly exactly this complex topic through 
discussing how national political factors in Indonesia and South Korea influenced the 
implementation of IMF reforms during the economic crisis in 1997-98. The lack of an 
overarching theory on this issue has left me with the ability to choose a wide approach in my 
thesis. The theoretical approaches and the independent variables are carefully chosen on the basis 
of how they can be said to relate to the topic under study. Important in this matter have been to 
combine elements that relate to Asian economic development prior to the crisis in 1997-98, with 
issues that are relevant in literature concerned with the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs in general.  
1.4.1 The dependent variable: The implementation of IMF reforms by the national 
government  
A dependent variable can be defined as a phenomenon that varies along some dimension, and it 
represents the topic that one seeks to explore (Becker 1992:206). In this study the dependent 
variable is implementation of IMF reforms by the national government. An economic crisis can 
be seen as an extreme case of economic policy failure, and the implementation of economic 
reforms is usually necessary to get the economy ‘back on track’. Economic reforms can be 
defined as any programme or package of measures designed to enact a significant economic 
change (Drazen 2000:615). The difference between economic reforms and ordinary economic 
changes is related to the scope, where economic reforms include a significant number of policy 
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changes that must be undertaken for the implementation to be successful. Reforms can vary in 
their nature, organizational intensity, and the required implementation skills. To conduct a study 
of the implementation of IMF reforms is necessary because failures to meet agreed targets occur 
too often and can reflect implementation difficulties (Nelson 1990:16). Through suggesting a 
framework of how political factors can influence the outcome of an implementation process I 
hope to explore the issue of the politics of economic reform implementation further. However, I 
am fully aware that it is difficult to measure exactly how a government implements IMF reforms, 
and there will be different opinions as to whether the implementation can be considered to be a 
success or a failure. Nevertheless, I see this as an interesting topic to explore further.  
 
1.4.2 The independent variables 
An independent variable can be defined as ‘a factor’s variation that influences the variation in the 
dependent variable’ (Becker 1992:206). In my thesis I have chosen to focus on four political 
factors that I see as relevant independent variables. The independent variables are all on the 
national political level and I will interpret them in the context of the interplay between the 
Indonesian and the South Korean governments and the IMF. I have chosen this particular four 
independent variables, because they relate to explanations of the successful implementation of 
economic reforms in the Asian region prior to the crisis, as well as they are associated with 
analyses of implementation of IMF reforms in general (Nelson:1990:18).11  
 
Theories on state capacity emphasize the following two independent variables as important when 
discussing reform implementation: 
 
1. Weberian characteristics of the bureaucracy. Important here is to what extent the 
bureaucracy is autonomous and insulated from particularistic interests, and whether the 
bureaucracy can be considered an elite service with meritocratic recruitment and 
predictable career ladders.  
2. Features associated with the relationship between the government and business sector. 
The focus here is to which degree is there an institutionalized relationship between these 
two sectors that enables the government to direct the business sector to work towards a 
common national goal.  
                                                 
11 I am fully aware that a thorough analysis of the implementation process in Indonesia and South Korea should include 
an independent variable that focus on the variation in the nature of the economic crisis in the respective countries 
(Nelson 1990:18). When I began to write this thesis, I included an economic variable in addition to the other four in my 
analysis. However, this proved to be too difficult because the economic explanations of the Asian crisis tend to be very 
detailed and very technical, and to include this variable in the further analysis would simply take up to much space. In 
order to make up for this I have in chapter 3 incorporated different explanations of the Asian crisis in general, as well 
as for Indonesia and South Korea, in order to show how the crisis differed in the two countries.  
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The perspective of regime capacity stresses the following two independent variables when 
exploring the issue of reform implementation:   
 
3. Authoritarian & democratic regimes’ decisiveness. The important question here is how 
different political structures are institutionalised in the respective regimes as to create 
efficiency in policy implementation.  
 
4. Popular support and interest articulation. Important here is how a regime’s support-base 
influences regime capacity to undertake reforms. Another aspect to consider is how the 
political institutional structure incorporates the state-society relationship as to increase 
regime capacity in implementing reforms. 
 
 
The following figure exemplifies the analytical framework to be used in this thesis:  
 
Context 
The interplay between the IMF and the recipient governments, where the recipient 
governments are faced with demands from the IMF to implement certain economic 
reforms. 
 
 
 
Independent variables: National political factors 
State capacity Regime capacity 
1.  
Weberian 
characteristics 
of the 
bureaucracy. 
2. 
Features associated 
with the relationship 
between the 
government and 
business sector. 
3.  
The possibility of 
decisive political 
action within the 
political 
institutional 
framework. 
4.  
How popular 
support and interest 
articulation are 
incorporated into the 
political institutional 
structure. 
 
Dependent variable:
Implementation of 
IMF reforms by the 
national government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Analytical framework 
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As the above figure illustrates I have incorporated the influence of the IMF into the analysis 
without treating it as an independent variable. The interplay between the IMF and the Indonesian 
and South Korean governments rather represents the context that the further analyses builds upon. 
I have structured my study around the four independent variables divided into two categories with 
respect to their theoretical approaches; state capacity and regime capacity. The independent 
variables are not seen as excluding each other in the sense of explanations, but rather meant to 
complete each other to get a fuller picture of the complex implementation process. 
 
 
1.5 Methodological considerations 
Little research has been done to evaluate how political factors influenced the process of 
implementation of IMF reforms in Indonesia and South Korea in 1997-98, nor is there a general 
theory about the implementation of IMF reforms. This indicates that an open approach towards 
this topic is needed. The methodological design of a study ‘is an effort to deal in one way or 
another with the influence of the subject on the object and with the consequences of this influence 
for the process of knowing and the knowledge yielded’ (Ellen 1984:14).12 This includes making 
decisions concerning methodological technique and approach, as well as to secure the robustness 
of the methodological design.  
1.5.1 Case study  
My object of study, how national political factors influenced the Indonesian and South Korean 
governments’ implementation of IMF reforms during the Asian economic crisis, is an empirical 
event set within a complex framework where the IMF played an important role. I have chosen to 
use the case study approach to better analyse this ‘particular contemporary phenomenon where 
the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 1994:13). 
The case study approach is not a methodological choice, but a specific technique to study an 
object. Case studies typically examine the interplay of all variables in order to provide a complete 
understanding of an event or situation. This thesis is structured around three separate, but 
intertwined empirical focuses: (i) the context where the interplay between the IMF and the 
                                                 
12 Researchers generally choose between two main types of methods to answer their empirical questions; the 
quantitative or the qualitative method. They differ as to how they find the pattern of the empirical material that is 
analysed. My analysis of the IMF implementation processes in Indonesia and South Korea has a qualitative approach to 
the issue, because it is based on my interpretations and impressions of the data that I have explored, and I do not intend 
to systemise or express my findings numerically.  
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recipient governments takes place (ii) the Indonesian and the South Korean state capacity to 
implement IMF reforms; (iii) the Indonesian and the South Korean regime capacity to implement 
IMF reforms.  
 
Andersen (1997:61) divides case studies into three different categories depending on how they 
relate to theory in their design. The first category is A-theoretical case studies, where the aim is 
not to use concepts or theories, or to understand some abstract construct or a general problem. 
The case under study is not chosen because it illustrates a particular trait or problem, but rather 
because of the uniqueness of the case itself. The second category is interpretative case studies. 
Case studies in this category use concepts and theoretical approaches to explore how conditions 
influence a certain event or phenomenon. One does not seek to generalise one’s findings in order 
to develop a theory, but rather uses theoretical perspectives as conceptual structures or as 
advanced organisers. The third and last category of case studies is concerned with generating 
theory, where the aim is to provide insight into an issue through refinement of theory. The case 
itself is of secondary interest, but it plays a supportive role in facilitating the theoretical 
understanding of a phenomenon through the testing of hypotheses.  
 
My analysis of political factors that have influenced the economic reform implementation in 
Indonesia and South Korea 1997-98 is an interpretive case study, and fits Andersen’s second 
category.13 I seek to explore how national political factors influenced the IMF reform 
implementation process, based on an empirical study of the Indonesian and South Korean 
experience. I use the theoretical approach of state capacity and regime capacity in order to 
structure my analysis, and I do not seek to verify or disprove hypotheses. Nor is my aim to 
generalise my findings in order to develop or test a theory. I rather seek to explore whether the 
analytical framework (the variables and the theoretical approaches) that I propose is important to 
the degree that it can be used as a ‘building block’. Meaning that in one way or another my 
analysis can offer insights that can be used to ask fruitful questions in other cases on the topic of 
the politics of economic reform implementation (Nelson 1990:17).  
 
                                                 
13 If I had just explored the Indonesian case I could have conducted an A-theoretical case study. However, I have 
chosen to compare two entities to better examine how they relate to the suggested theoretical perspectives, and thus my 
analysis fits Andersen’s second category of case studies, the interpretive case study.  
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1.5.2 Methodological approach: Comparative case study 
My study is comparative, which means that my methodological design is based on a comparison 
between two cases, Indonesia and South Korea.14 Through comparing Indonesia and South Korea 
I can explore more thoroughly how these cases relate to the theoretical perspectives proposed, 
and thus gain a better understanding of the common and diverging features of the two cases. The 
aim of the comparison is to explore how two governments with different political institutional 
characteristics handled the implementation of IMF reforms in 1997-98. The Indonesian and the 
South Korean cases are seen as unique, but they enhance some common characteristics that make 
it possible to compare them. The similarity between Indonesia and South Korea is that both 
countries experienced serious economic problems stemming from the same regional economic 
crisis of 1997-98, and both sought the assistance of the IMF and received ‘rescue packages’ with 
requirements for wide-ranging reform programs. Both countries also belong to a region that has 
experienced a high rate of economic growth the last 30 years, which many argue was due to an 
interventionist state (Wade 1990, Johnson 1982, Amsden 1989). An additional characteristic is 
that authoritarian leaders have ruled both Indonesia and South Korea, and largely legitimised their 
rule by developing authoritarian political ideologies and delivered rapid economic growth. 
However, the major difference between these two cases important to this study, is their different 
experience in relation to the implementation of IMF reforms.15 The international community and 
the IMF applauded South Korea’s crisis management and reform implementation, while 
Indonesia was perceived as the ‘basket case’ where an authoritarian political system was unable 
to deal with the crisis and the following implementation of the required IMF reforms.  
 
I will explore the Indonesian case in more detail, because I find that the politics of reform 
implementation is best illustrated in this case. Indonesia had experienced economic crises 
previously in the 1970s and 1980s, but at that time president Suharto dealt with the problems 
quite effectively. So the question is what went ‘wrong’ in Indonesia during the crisis of 1997-98? 
                                                 
14 In my study I use an inductive approach, because I reason from the outcome of the reform implementation process in 
Indonesia and South Korea back to prior events through exploring my suggested independent variables. However, my 
study is not purely inductive, since my choice of independent variables is deducted from my theoretical perspectives of 
state and regime capacity. To pursue a thorough deductive strategy would prove very difficult in my case, because there 
is no
 
comprehensive theory on economic reform implementation to deduct hypotheses from.  
 
15 There are also other differences between these countries, like Indonesia for instance was still under the authoritarian 
rule of president Suharto when the Asian economic crisis broke in 1997, while South Korea was considered being in 
‘democratic transition’ after the first democratic elections held in 1987. These countries also differ with respect to their 
economic policies during their economic high growth period. While South Korea was considered a developmental 
state, many argued that Indonesia never quite fitted into this category (Önis 1991, Moon & Prashad 1994).  
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Despite a seemingly quick response to the crisis and a rapid implementation of macro-economic 
reforms in the wake of the crisis, Indonesia was soon the country in Asia that was hardest hit. My 
interest is how a focus on national political factors can help understand this swift development in 
Indonesia from seemingly successful crisis management to an obvious basket case.  
 
Apart from making comparisons between the two entities, Indonesia and South Korea, I will also 
compare the Indonesian reform process in 1997-98 to Suharto’s earlier successful reform 
implementation. Important in this matter is the implementation of the economic reforms aimed at 
liberalisation of the Indonesian economy in the 1980s. However, this comparison will not be as 
systematically undertaken as the comparison between the Indonesian and the South Korean 
experiences. Nevertheless a comparison over time is valuable for a better understanding of what 
went ‘wrong’ in Indonesia in 1997-98.   
 
1.5.3 Sources and collection of data 
Three methods of data collection have been used in this thesis: the examination of documents, the 
observation method and the interview method.16 I have examined primary sources like IMF and 
World Bank documents. However, most of my understanding of the Indonesian and South 
Korean experiences is based on secondary literature and documents; that is books published in 
English by relevant western and Asian specialists, newspapers, magazines, academic and journal 
articles, and websites concerned with information and discussion about the Asian crisis. There is 
a great variety on material available concerning the Asian crisis and the political economy of 
Indonesia and South Korea. However, to make up for the lack of studies focusing on the political 
aspects of the handling of the Asian crisis and the following reform implementation, I have 
examined relevant literature on political aspects of economic crisis management in general, and 
particularly studies that focus on IMF assistance in relation to this.  
 
I have also used the observation and the interview method in preparing this thesis. I visited 
Indonesia in January 2001 and made 15 interviews with academics, government officials, 
business representatives and NGO activists.17 During my stay in Indonesia I had the possibility to 
                                                 
16 The main types of exploration methods are taken from Andersen & Gamdrup (1994:63-74) where they are labelled 
‘dokumentariske metoder’, ‘observerende metoder’ og ‘spørgende metoder’.  
17 The interviews were structured around 6 central questions that I had prepared beforehand: (i) how do you see the 
present economic situation in Indonesia in relation to the economic development in Indonesia prior to the Asian crisis; 
(ii) what do you see as the main cause of the Indonesian economic crisis in 1997-98; (iii) what is your opinion of the 
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discuss the ideas developed in this thesis with scholarly experts on Indonesian politics and 
economy. My stay in Jakarta and Yogyakarta also provided me with the valuable opportunity to 
observe the context in which the events in Indonesia had taken place. My interviews and the 
observation of the Indonesian context proved to be important sources for my understanding and 
reasoning about my case. However, the character of my interviews was a way of testing ideas I 
had at the time of the interviews and to develop new ideas confirming my argument. The 
information that I gathered from the interviews has been important in narrowing down the topic 
under study, rather than using the interviews as primary sources in my analysis.  
 
1.5.4 Evaluation of the sources: The reliability and validity of the data 
When using a particular methodological design it is important to judge the quality of this design. 
Questions concerning validity and reliability of the study are important in this matter.18 The 
validity of a study depends on what is measured and concerns whether the measured phenomenon 
is relevant to what is being studied (Hellevik 1991:159). Reliability refers to how the data is 
measured and the precision with which such measurements are carried out (ibid.).  
 
A valid study indicates that there is a relevant connection between the theoretical approach and 
the empirical data that is studied. The question that I seek to answer in this thesis is how national 
political factors influence governments’ implementation of IMF reforms. I am fully aware that it 
is difficult to measure which national political factors that have been relevant to the 
implementation process. Politics focuses on many different levels and it can be difficult to judge 
how certain political factors influence economic processes or outcomes. External factors like 
international investors’ response to the IMF reforms, international prices on export and import 
goods, and bad weather conditions, can influence the implementation process irrelevant of the 
national political factors that I see as relevant. In order to make up for my problem concerning the 
validity of my analysis, I have used the strategy of ‘theory triangulation’ (Johnson 1997). The 
overriding purpose of triangulation is to combine different sources and research procedures to 
crosscheck information and conclusions. To secure the validity of this study I have examined 
                                                                                                                                                 
role of IMF in handling the crisis in Indonesia in 1997-98; (iv) why was the implementation of IMF reforms 
problematic in Indonesia; (v) what do you think is the main difference between the Indonesian and the South Korean 
implementation of the IMF reforms; (vi) who do you think made the political decisions in relation to the crisis 
management in 1997-98.  However, I adjusted the questioning to the situation, and the interviews usually lasted about 
one hour. I taped all the interviews so that the information I gathered can be checked if required.  
18 The term ‘validity’ has traditionally been attached to quantitative research tradition, and some qualitative researchers 
have argued that this concept should not be applied to qualitative research because this term is not relevant to the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of qualitative research (Johnson 1997). 
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various theoretical approaches, like different economic perspectives, public administration 
theories and social group approaches, to see which political factors they see as relevant for their 
understanding of how governments can influence the implementation of economic reforms. I 
have compared the different political factors emphasised within the various theoretical 
approaches, and the independent variables suggested in this thesis are based on this theory 
triangulation.  
 
A possible weakness concerning the reliability of my thesis is that most of my data is based on 
secondary literature, which implies that I rely to a large degree on other researchers’ 
interpretations. It represents a problem, because I have no guarantee that their interpretations are 
reliable. In order to accommodate this problem I have used the technique of ‘data triangulation’ 
through exploring secondary literature from various academic disciplines. I have also tried to be 
as accurate as possible, using correct citations and always referring to my sources when using 
their arguments, so that the quotations could be checked with the original source to understand 
the context in which they are stated.   
 
1.6 The structure of the thesis 
In the next chapter, chapter 2, I will proceed with a thorough presentation of the theoretical 
perspectives used in this study. I will give a brief description of features of the so-called 
‘developmental state’, to show how the impressive economic growth in some Asian states was 
explained. Then I will proceed with an introduction to theories concerned with state capacity, 
where the focus is on bureaucratic organisation and the tight relationship between the government 
and the business sector. Through discussing different regime types’ political institutional structure 
and the incorporation of popular support and interest articulation in the political structure I will 
explore the issue of regime capacity in reform implementation. In the last part of chapter 2 I will 
discuss issues that are relevant with regard to the interplay between the IMF and the recipient 
government in order to better understand the context that this interaction creates. In chapter 2 I 
will finally present a model where I have developed five relevant empirical questions derived 
from the theoretical arguments made in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 3 will provide background information about the Indonesian and the South Korean 
economic development prior to the crisis. In this chapter I will also briefly discuss the Asian 
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economic crisis and consider two different approaches interpreting the causes of the crisis in 
general, and more specifically for Indonesia and South Korea.  
 
Chapters 4 to 6 present the analysis of the Indonesian and the South Korean implementation of 
IMF reforms. In chapter 4 I will discuss the context that creates the framework for governments’ 
actions when they are faced with demands from the IMF to implement certain economic reforms. 
In chapter 5 and 6 I focus on the four national political factors that I have defined as independent 
variables, in order to discuss the question that my thesis examines: How national political factors 
influence governments’ implementation of IMF reforms. In chapter 5 I will use the theoretical 
perspective of state capacity to explore the workings and the characteristics of the bureaucracy 
both prior to and during the crisis in the two countries. This chapter will also address features of 
the relationship between the government and the business sector in order to explore different 
reform implementation strategies in Indonesia and South Korea. In chapter 6 I will discuss how 
the theoretical perspective of regime capacity can help to explore the possibility of decisive 
political action within the political institutional structures. I will also consider the issues of 
popular support and interest articulation in relation to how they can influence the reform 
implementation process with regards to regime capacity.  
 
In my conclusion, chapter 7, I will compare and summarise my empirical findings and evaluate 
the theoretical framework that I have proposed.  
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL TERRAIN  
As I said in the introduction there is no comprehensive theory on the topic of economic reform 
implementation. A number of different theories and research issues are relevant to different 
aspects of the implementation process, but no theory provides an encompassing conceptual 
scheme or theory. In my theoretical approach I have taken this into consideration, and I will 
present two theoretical perspectives concerned with the issue of the capacity of national political 
systems to implement reforms. First, the state capacity perspective is chosen in order to gain a 
better understanding of the technical and administrative capacity of states to implement reforms. 
The second approach involving regime capacity builds upon theories concerned with how certain 
political institutional structures can facilitate effective reform implementation. Combining these 
two perspectives I hope to get a better overall picture of the implementation processes in 
Indonesia and South Korea. I can explore the way political institutional design can facilitate or 
hinder effective reform implementation, and at the same consider how regime capacity can 
facilitate economic policy management.  
 
This chapter is divided into five parts. In the first part I will briefly discuss two important 
characteristics of the developmental state: the autonomous bureaucracy with a commitment to 
national development, and the institutionalised relationship between the government and the 
business sector. The issue of the developmental state is important because it suggests an approach 
to the study of the economic growth in the Asian region. In the second part of this chapter I will 
explore two arguments based within the tradition of state capacity: First, that a bureaucracy with 
Weberian characteristics is necessary for a successful reform implementation. Second, that an 
‘embedded’ relationship between the government and the business sector is crucial for the ability 
of the state to undertake sudden shifts in the economy.19 In the third part of this chapter I will 
explore how regime capacity is related to theoretical approaches concerned with the relevance of 
the structure of political institutions. In doing so I will be examining how a decisive political 
institutional structure can be said to relate to certain political regime types, and how popular 
support and interest articulation are incorporated in the structure of political institutions as to 
increase regime capacity. In the fourth part of this chapter I will focus on the international context 
                                                 
19 Embedded relationships refer to informal interactions and institutional linkages between the state and important 
actors in the private sector (Evans 1995:59). 
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that often surrounds a reform implementation, and I will discuss issues that relate to tensions 
between the recipient-country and the IMF regarding reform implementation. In the final part I 
will present five empirical questions that I see as relevant for the further analysis, based on the 
theoretical arguments made in this chapter.  
 
2.1 The developmental state 
In the first part of this chapter I will briefly examine two features concerning the developmental 
state: the autonomous bureaucracy and the close government and business relations. Charmers 
Johnson (1982) was the first to refer to the Asian states as 'capitalist developmental states'. 
According to him the economic development in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan had an 
underlying commitment to private property and the market in order to develop private capitalism. 
A special thing about the developmental East Asian states, however, was that state intervention 
superseded this commitment by influencing private business decisions using persuasion, coercion, 
and by manipulating the parameters of private decision-making in order to best implement 
economic reforms.20 The strategic power of the East Asian developmental states depended on 
state intervention through institutional links between the political insulated state agencies and 
major private sector firms (Önis 1991:114). In short, the following two aspects characterize the 
developmental state with regard to its successful economic reform implementation aspects 
(Ibid:111).21 First, an autonomous bureaucracy with one political objective: national economic 
development. Second, specific institutional structures where the government cooperated with the 
business sector in order to reach national economic goals.  
 
2.1.1 An autonomous bureaucracy 
The model of the developmental state entails a strong and determined state that protects a 
powerful and competent bureaucracy that largely shapes and directs development policy. During 
the early stages of the developmental state, the bureaucracy had a relatively clear and given 
                                                 
20 The developmental states’ economic development must be understood politically, in which the state’s defined 
national goal has been economic growth inspired by political and nationalist objectives of the late developer, concerned 
to protect and promote itself. Political factors have shaped the thrust and pace of the developmental strategies through 
the structures of the state (Leftwich 1994:421). 
21 For a more thorough review of the characteristics of developmental states, see Leftwich (1994) where he identifies 
six features of the developmental state; a determined developmental elite; a relatively autonomous state; a powerful, 
competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; a weak and subordinated civil society; the effective management of 
non-state economic interests; and last, performance based legitimacy.  
 17
problem definition of ‘catching up’ and played an important role as a vital instrument for the state 
leadership to achieve its objects and goals in relation to national economic development. The 
bureaucracy operated in a strict top-down hierarchy driven by the need for efficiency, but more 
importantly held together by a commitment to a clear mission: national economic growth. 
Bureaucratic action was guided by general, politically pre-established formal legal rules along 
Weberian lines (Koh 1997:119). An important question within the literature concerned with the 
developmental state is why the effective and well-functioning bureaucracy was directed towards 
national goals, and not towards rent seeking.22 Extremely meritocratic form of recruitment is 
stressed in relation to this. Rigorous standards of entry not only ensured a high degree of 
bureaucratic capacity but also generated a sense of unity and common identity on the part of the 
bureaucratic elite. The bureaucrats were imbued with a sense of mission and identified 
themselves with national goals derived from their high status position in the society.   
 
Another central feature of the developmental states’ bureaucratic organisation was the power and 
the autonomy of the elite bureaucracy that were centred in certain key ministries. A pilot agency, 
like the Ministry of International Trade and Industry  (MITI) in Japan, played a crucial role in the 
strategic planning of policy formulation and implementation. Through its control and power over 
a few selected strategic sectors of the economy, it had the ability to direct and assist these sectors 
in accordance with national economic goals (Johnson 1982).  
 
2.1.2 Government and business relations  
The unusual degree of institutionalised government-business relations was also important in 
understanding the ability of the East Asian states to direct the business sector towards the defined 
national economic goals. Amsden's (1989) study of the South Korean state’s economic policy 
implementation from the 1960s until the mid-1980s, stressed subsidy allocation as the most 
important tool for the government to ‘control’ the business sector. The state was not a banker, but 
used subsidies to decide what, when, and how much to produce and which strategic industries to 
favour. In an economy built upon a system of subsidies, Amsden argues that the government 
                                                 
22 Rent- seeking refers to the possibility for earning economic rent created by governmental action, for example through 
issuing licenses or permits to engage in various forms of economic activity (Meier & Rauch 2000:434). Rent seeking 
activities can be legal, but is also refers to actions which involves illegal activity like bribery, corruption, smuggling 
and black markets. 
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controls the private enterprises through granting or withholding industrial licenses, bank loans 
and advanced technology. The government does not only subsidize industries to stimulate growth, 
but also sets stringent performance criteria in exchange for these subsidies. If firms turn out to be 
unprofitable, the state has no obligation to bail them out, so the subsidies do not lead to a waste of 
resources in the long run. Amsden argues that the ability of the state to discipline firms must be 
seen in relation to the power and autonomy of the state. In the early 1960s in South Korea, there 
were no financiers to challenge the government’s power because the banking system of the 
colonial period was renationalised, the business community was as weak as the financial 
community and dependent on the state for access to resources, the working classes were small in 
number and there were few large landholders. The lack of interest groups that could challenge the 
power and authority of the state increased the autonomy of the South Korean state, and enhanced 
its ability to direct the private sector towards national goals.23  
 
2.2 State capacity 
In this second part of this chapter I will discuss the theoretical approach of state capacity. The 
study of state capacity has been influenced by the impressive economic development in East Asia 
during the 1970s, and the focus is on the technical and administrative capacity of states to 
successfully formulate and implement economic reforms. Following in the tradition of the 
literature about the developmental state, an important argument is that a well functional 
bureaucracy along Weberian lines is a significant feature of high state capacity (Evans 1995, 
Weiss 1998). In addition to a ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy, the state apparatus and the government 
should also have the administrative and technical capacity to direct the business sector towards 
                                                 
23 Inherent in many of the theses about the developmental state is the notion of the ‘irony of state strength’, implying 
that state autonomy erodes through time (Lauridsen 1995:31). The argument of ‘the irony of state strength’ is that 
strategic state intervention will generate powerful societal interests that will seek to challenge the influence of the state, 
because of its ‘need’ to be independent of it. Thus the more effective the state’s involvement in the economy is, the 
more it increases the independence and power of private capital, and the more the state undermines its own viability. 
This way, the state ends up ‘digging its own grave’ by being developmentally effective. Thus, the state is likely to lose 
its unity and its capacity to ‘direct’ the business sector without adequate links between the state and the business sector, 
or the ability of the state to interact with interest groups and social forces. Evans (1995:230) argues that this has been 
the case in South Korea, where the successful industrialisation had bred a strong, independent class of industrialists 
anxious to pull free of the state’s tightening strings. He shows that the allies of the elites and those who were politically 
excluded from the institutionalised networks that combined the state and society acquired an interest in curtailing the 
institutionalised relationship that made the developmental states so successful in the first place. In South Korea there 
was no kind of innovation in the state-society relations that would incorporate the wider society and the developmental 
state’s special institutional advantages seemed destined to erode.   
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the state’s national economic goals, and the ability of the state to allocate financial resources into 
desired sectors is crucial.  
 
2.2.1 Mobilizing the bureaucracy for economic change  
The role of the bureaucracy in facilitating economic growth has been a debated issue since Max 
Weber’s (1947) classic argument that the bureaucracy was one of the fundamental institutions for 
capitalist growth. Weber’s ideal bureaucracy is a public administrative organization characterized 
by meritocratic recruitment and predictable, long term rewards. The state apparatus is to be 
guided by an impersonal use of legislature, predictable outcomes, specialised expertise, authority 
on the basis of formal criteria, as well as the notion that entry and promotion into the civil service 
depend on formal standards of achievement. This would in turn reinforce informal peer networks 
that placed a high value on performance and organizational goals and not on personal 
qualifications (Evans & Rauch 1999). This model of the ideal state apparatus is based on the 
argument that the government should develop national economic goals, while the state apparatus 
is the neutral and effective apparatus that carries out the decisions. Using a recent and original 
data set, Evans & Rauch (ibid) examined the characteristics of the economic bureaucratic 
agencies and the growth records of a sample of 35 developing countries for the 1970-1990 period. 
They argue that Weberian characteristics of the bureaucracy significantly enhance prospects for 
economic growth, when controlled for initial levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
and human capital. A Weberian bureaucracy is seen as efficient and loyal to the government and 
sufficiently powerful to prefer long-term national goals to short-term political advantages and 
particularistic interests. There are especially two components that are important in this matter. 
First, that meritocratic recruitment ideally based on some combination of education and 
examination secures a minimal competence. It also helps to generate corporate coherence and the 
identification with the bureaucrat role that again can influence the motivation of individual office 
holders. Meritocratic recruitment can also lead to more internalised shared norms and goals that 
can increase the ‘esprit de corps’. This kind of identification with colleagues and the state 
organization generate norms where corrupt activities are seen as subverting national goals thus 
increasing the effectiveness of monitoring. Second, the bureaucracy is built upon a predictable, 
rewarding career ladder, which increases the competence and the coherence of the state apparatus 
in the long run. This argument is based on the observation that the cost of breaking organisational 
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norms is also directly proportional to the expected durability of membership in the organization 
and the expected rewards.24 
 
2.2.3 Embedded government and business relations 
In theories concerning the developmental state many scholars stress the notion of a separation 
between the state and the society (Brødsgård & Young 2000:3). The state was seen as powerful 
because of its autonomy, and thus able to formulate and impose policies upon the society. Peter 
Evans (1995:59) challenges the notion that state capacity equals insulation from the private sector 
or interest groups. He argues that high state capacity requires informal interactions and 
institutional linkages between the state and important actors in the private sector. His concept of 
‘embedded autonomy’ captures the combination of internal coherence within the state and the 
bureaucracy along with an external connectedness with the private sector. Embedded autonomy is 
important in two respects. First, that policy networks that link business and government is seen as 
positive because they increase the flow of information thus improving the quality of 
policymaking. Second, some kind of connectedness between the state and the business sector is 
needed because the state relies on the private sector for implementation of their policies.  Weiss 
(1998) agrees with Evans and develops his argument further into a concept that she refers to as 
‘governed interdependence’. Governed interdependence refers to ‘a negotiated relationship, in 
which public and private participants maintain their autonomy, yet which is nevertheless 
                                                 
24 As a counterweight to the Weberian understanding of the bureaucracy, the neo-liberalists focus on rent-seeking and 
corrupt bureaucrats as an obstacle to successful reform implementation. A general definition of corruption is the use of 
public office for private gain. This includes bribery and extortion, which necessarily involve at least two parties, and 
other types of malfeasance that a public official can carry out alone, including fraud and embezzlement (World Bank 
1997). Bureaucratic performance is by the neo-liberalists explained in terms of a principal-agent relationship, where the 
bureaucracy and the state are powerful and determined outside agents, and the principal is the populace (Geddes 
1994:40).  The ‘agent’ takes action on behalf of a ‘principal’ where the optimal action from the principals’ point of 
view depends on the information available only to the agent. The principal- agent relationship is characterised by 
differences in interests concerning intentions and actions as both parts seek to maximise expected utility (Drazeen 
2000:30). Neo-liberalists stress that there will always be a chance that the state will act on the grounds of self interest, 
rather than in the interest of the population, because of lacking monitoring and implementation strategies (Krueger 
1990:20). This argument must be seen in relation to their view that the state as an institution cannot resist becoming a 
tool for special interest groups and their various demands. Instead of serving the public interests, the state ends up 
serving particularist interest groups, who it is expected to regulate. Government failure with regard to economic reform 
implementation is explained in terms of the bureaucrats rent-seeking activity. Rents will be generated only in 
circumstances where the licenses or the permits effectively restrict economic activity below what it would be in their 
absence. Government failure is a result of the tendency of state officials to endorse restrictions on economic activity for 
the main purpose of creating rents, which they can capture through rent-seeking bribery, or allocate to family, friends 
or political cronies.  
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governed by broader goals set and monitored by the state’ (ibid:38). The linkage between the 
state and the private sector enables the state to disperse information and to interact with various 
interest groups and social forces. The institutional linkages between the state and the private 
sector provides constant interaction and feedback of information, which gives the bureaucracy a 
more realistic picture of the overall economic process, and enhances their chances for taking 
effective action. This increases the state’s central position in guiding the market, but also shows a 
basic reciprocity and agreement between the state and two or more parties for advancing common 
interests. The co-ordination and long-term calculation is seen as essential to successful economic 
policy implementation, and secures high state capacity. However, Weiss (ibid.) stresses that this 
relationship is characterised by a mutual dependence and does not require a ‘strong’ state in the 
developmental state meaning, where the state had power enough to impose its policies on the 
private sector.  The concept of governed interdependence focuses on the government and business 
relationships as they together develop national goals and cooperate in order to reach them.  
 
2.3 Regime capacity 
Within the developmental state literature an important argument is that the Asian states were able 
to impose their policies on the society and the business sector because of their authoritarian 
political institutional structure. This argument follows in the tradition that sees regimes’ capacity 
to implement reforms as rooted in the structure of political institutions. One heavily debated issue 
within this theoretical approach of regime capacity has been the decisiveness and effectiveness in 
reform implementation of authoritarian versus democratic regimes. Another important topic has 
been to see how popular support and interest articulation can be incorporated in the political 
institutional structure as to contribute to increasing regime capacity in reform implementation.   
 
2.3.1 The decisiveness of political regimes  
Sachs (1990) argues that authoritarian regimes are more successful than democratic ones in 
implementing economic reforms, because their leaders can act effectively without fear of being 
voted out of office by those who experience short-term negative effects such as job loss, lower 
incomes and reduced social services. This enables authoritarian regimes to make decisions 
according to technical criteria of economic rationality and to maintain reform programmes long 
enough to produce positive growth. During the 1990s the thesis regarding the effectiveness in 
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reform implementation of authoritarian regimes was questioned, and empirical evidence showed 
that there was no obvious causal relationship between capacity to implement economic reforms 
and regime type (Geddes 1995). Now democratic governments were considered to be better at 
creating support in the populace for their reforms thus enabling them to sustain policies over time. 
In relation to authoritarian regimes Geddes stresses that they had a greater tendency not to initiate 
and implement reforms that threatened the interests of the political and business elite who 
benefited from the protective tariffs, contracts, subsidies, licenses and tax breaks. Authoritarian 
regimes did not necessarily guarantee the autonomy required to impose unpopular economic 
reforms, nor did the electoral process of electoral democracy necessarily obstruct them.25 
 
One important aspect of the debate about political regimes has been to examine what type of 
institutional design that best facilitates or hinders decisiveness in the policy process and in the 
implementation of reforms. Decisiveness refers to how various institutional configurations can 
influence the extent to which political regimes promote qualities such as efficiency in 
policymaking (MacIntyre 1999a:5). Important in this respect is the number of veto points, that is, 
the ability of political institutions like the legislature and independent regulatory agencies, to veto 
policy proposals.  The argument is that few veto points indicates an effective and decisive 
political institutional structure. Criticisms against this argument rather point out credibility of 
policy commitments as being more important than a decisive political institutional structure for a 
successful implementation of reforms. If governments are subject to little or no constraints (few 
veto points) their policy promises have little credibility, because policies can easily be reversed 
and make the economic climate unstable and unpredictable. This implies that regimes with a 
decisive political institutional structure carry the risk of being interpreted as unpredictable and 
thus not credible. The argument of those that rather focus on credibility than decisiveness of 
political institutions is that successful policy implementation requires cooperation or approval of 
other political institutions, because such political structures create a stable and predictable 
economic and political environment that can increase investments in the economy (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
25 Formally, hierarchical systems like the Philippine one-party state during the Marcos era show that complex networks 
of patronage can weaken the coherence of policy, and penetrate authoritarian states (Haggard 1992:227).  
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2.3.2 Popular support and interest articulation  
One important feature of the Asian authoritarian states was the suppression of civil society and 
the ability of the state to override particular interests groups. But how is the issue of popular 
support and interest articulation incorporated in theories about the capacity of regimes to 
implement reforms? There are two themes that are important in relation to this. First, if the 
national government is seen as a rational actor that seeks to remain in power, the level of support 
for the government is seen as important in explaining to which degree the government chooses to 
undertake reforms. Second, that the political institutional feature of corporatism shows how 
interest articulation is incorporated into the political institutional structure in order to increase 
regime capacity to implement reforms.   
 
The level of support for the government is important in explanations that see the state as being 
headed by rational political leaders that seek to remain in office (Geddes 1994:7, Killick 
1998:152). The argument is that governments behave according to the result of calculations of the 
likely cost and benefits of implementing reforms, and they act when they perceive it to be in their 
interest. If support from one particular group is important for the government, a difficult situation 
can occur if implementation of economic reforms will seriously harm this particular group. For 
example governments depending mainly on labour and popular support are more likely to take 
considerations towards these groups than governments relying on business and financial support 
(Nelson 1990:25). However, if the government experiences broad support for their reform 
implementation this can lead to effective implementation, because the government has ‘nothing to 
lose’. Governments facing upcoming electoral challenges have been reluctant to impose 
unpopular programmes, while incoming governments (both democratic and authoritarian) have 
taken advantage of a ‘honeymoon’ period (Haggard 1992).26 According to this view authoritarian 
regimes are better off in economic reform implementation, because they do not have to take into 
account a forthcoming election. Democratic political institutions that consist of fragmented 
interests and a lack of political consensus can be more likely not to implement reforms.  
 
                                                 
26 The honeymoon hypothesis states that economic reformers are likely to enjoy greater freedom of political manoeuvre 
immediately after they take office, when difficult decisions can be blamed as the legacy of the outgoing government 
(Williamson & Haggard 1994:571). 
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Following from the arguments presented above concerning the role of popular support for a 
government’s policies, an important question is how interest representation is incorporated into 
the structure of political institutions in order to increase the capacity of regimes to implement 
reforms. The issue of corporatism is important in this matter. Corporatism refers to how a 
political system organises the relationship between the state and society. The basis of corporatist 
political structures is the notion that organised consensus and cooperation is needed, in contrast to 
competition and conflict oriented interest based models of organization that see politics as a battle 
between rational actors that make up groups that seek to maximise their self interest (Unger & 
Chan 1996:96). Corporatism can be divided into two different categories: state or societal 
corporatism (Weiss 1998:24). State corporatism is where a regime tends to have a ‘top down’ 
structure, where political institutions are set up to manage the ‘masses’, especially groups like 
labour and religious movements (Østerud 1991:82). The state is seen as strong, and social groups 
are highly organised by the state and used as instruments to channel public policies rather than 
being negotiating partners (Weiss 1998:37). The other form of corporatism, societal corporatism, 
describes a state that seeks to include social groups in the decision-making process in order to 
increase its capacity to develop and implement policies. The leaders of the participating social 
groups in a societal-corporatist state are beholden to their members and not to the state. Moreover 
the state is not in a position to dictate the terms of agreements between the various social groups 
and the state. The state compensates for its lacking ability to dictate through its 
institutionalisation of negotiations, which can be effective in order to mobilise wide support and 
agreement over the implementation of policies, hence binding central societal actors to important 
policy agreements. This issue also relates to credibility of political institutions, because as social 
corporatism enhances the support of reforms and policy implementation, this political 
institutional structure can increase the predictability of the economic environment, which again 
can attract investors that favour a predictable and credible economic environment.  
 
The common denominator in both the state and societal form of corporatism is institutionalised 
public - private cooperation in the process of policy formulation and implementation. 
Corporatism relates to regimes’ capacity to implement reforms either by stressing that state 
corporatism can be effective because the leaders can push through their reforms without taking 
any considerations for the public’s interests, because there are no groups that can oppose their 
actions. On the other hand one can argue that societal corporatism can increase regimes’ capacity 
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to undertake reforms, because the participation and the bargaining process between the state and 
social groups secures legitimacy and support for reforms, which eases the implementation.27  
 
2.4 The role of IMF and economic reform implementation  
This thesis is concerned with how political factors can influence the implementation of economic 
reforms by the Indonesian and the South Korean governments during the economic crisis in Asia 
in 1997-98. However, the implementation of reforms by the national governments cannot be 
understood properly unless one also focuses on the international context where the national 
implementation process occurs. In this fourth section of this chapter I will introduce issues that 
relate to the interplay between the IMF and the recipient governments when governments are 
faced with demands to implement economic reforms. The support of international actors plays an 
important role when states need urgent help during an economic or financial crisis. When a 
country experiences a severe economic crisis and calls upon the assistance of an international 
financial organization, the process of designing an adjustment programme starts. In the case of 
the IMF it takes the form of a structural adjustment programme, where loan support is based on 
the principle of conditionality.28 This means that IMF assistance is only granted if a country 
accepts the negotiated adjustment plan that contains certain policy commitments and performance 
criteria.29 The idea of multilateral financial support is justified on the grounds that the multilateral 
                                                 
27 The developmental states were often described in terms of state corporatism, where authoritarian corporatist 
structures were necessary in order to overcome obstacles related to being a ‘late developer’ and to direct the economy 
towards heavy export promotion. A part of the East Asian strategy of export-led industrialisation meant that labour 
unions had to be kept passive and excluded from interest representation (Deyo 1989). The system of state corporatism 
proved to be a suitable political structure for this purpose, like in South Korea where the government introduced 
legislation in 1961 requiring all labour unions to be legally recognised by the government. Unger & Chan (1996:99) 
argue that the state corporatist structure in East Asia was facilitated by historical circumstances. The East Asian states 
were strong states at the beginning of the industrialisation and the state was autonomous from interest group pressures, 
which enabled the state to legitimise state corporatism in the name of national development. Some stress that the East 
Asian states also have shared a cultural bias favourable of corporatist structures (Leftwich 1994, Unger & Chan 1996). 
In Confucian teachings, which prevailed in the East Asian cultures, private interests were viewed as equivalent to 
selfishness. The greater good was ideally manifested in a consensus overseen by the moral authority of the leadership, 
reflected in a top-down paternalism, which was suited for a political structure based on state corporatism.  
28 The structural adjustment programme requires changes in macroeconomic policies, including the exchange rate 
regime, interest rates, price policies and budgetary stance. IMF also calls for transformations of the regulatory regime 
and improved incentives to the private sector as well as the acceptance of a commitment to privatise significant 
segments of the public sector. Structural adjustments can be characterized as a mixture of economic stabilization, 
liberalization and reducing state economic activities often based on a neo-liberal economic ideology. 
29 ‘Moral hazard’ is a concept that is used in connection with over-provision of loans or slack conditionality. According 
to the view that governments are rational actors, one can argue that the government will seek to minimize the costs of 
the adjustment programme, both politically and economically. In a situation with weak conditionality, the government 
can seek to relax their adjustment efforts or to divert resources into financing consumption. This can also occur if IMF 
recognizes that the country seeking assistance is a strategically important country, thereby offering loans under very 
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organizations act in the interest of world welfare in order to prevent financial crises from 
spreading to the international market. Their mandate for assistance is based on the following two 
arguments. First, that international private creditors are not able to afford the kind of conditional 
loans that are needed in a reform process. Second, that international organizations as lenders can 
allocate national resources effectively on the international arena, so that countries affected by 
crises will not have to compete against each other in the process of reaching bilateral agreements, 
which could slow down and ruin the reform process. From this, the implications of IMF’s 
mandate can be seen from two different aspects. First, that the IMF can ‘force’ a government to 
implement certain economic reforms, even though they might contradict governments’ own 
interests. Second, that the cooperation between the recipient government and the IMF in relation 
to reform implementation increase the credibility of the government on a national as well as an 
international level.   
 
2.4.1 National resentment towards the IMF 
The ability of the IMF to stipulate the key elements of a recipient government’s policies can be a 
source of national resentment, not least because it may be an unwanted reminder of the unequal 
distribution of power between the two parties (Killick 1998:93). As noted above, some see IMF’s 
mandate as an opportunity to ‘force’ a government to implement certain economic reforms even 
though they might contradict the governments’ own interests.  Concerning this issue of erosion of 
national sovereignty, a common dilemma is when the recipient country’s government on the one 
hand seeks to recover from a crisis through the assistance of the IMF, and on the other hand has 
to deal with the social, political and economic consequences of the required reforms that can 
cause political and social instability. This dilemma becomes serious when the national 
government experiences that the IMF has a fundamental different ideological approach to the 
needed economic reforms (Kahler 1993). There can be a perception that the reforms suggested by 
the IMF reflects a subordination of national policies to external forces, and the government can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
loose conditions, regardless of the government’s commitment to adjustment. To prevent the ‘moral hazard’ problem the 
IMF now to a larger degree that earlier insists on a closer monitoring of the recipient countries, on policy actions prior 
to the negotiation of a loan, greater specificity and scope in the description of conditions and a tighter cross-
conditionality among the multilateral institutions and bilateral donors. On the other hand, if the conditions are too 
demanding, programmes may cause social unrest that can undermine the adjustment process as well as cause politically 
unstable conditions.  
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seen as an agent for western interests and ideology if they choose to implement the agreed 
economic reforms (ibid).30  
2.4.2 The IMF and domestic alliances 
In order to successfully implement a programme the IMF often engages in strategies that attempt 
to shape the incentives of their counterparts by influencing the national political level that 
surrounds the implementation of an agreement (Kahler 1993). The IMF can undertake a campaign 
of suasion within a government but also outside of the government to encourage the formation of 
a supportive domestic coalition or to shore up an existing one. Kahler (ibid.) sees the most 
important trans-national alliance as between the IMF and domestic bureaucrats working in the 
finance ministry and the Central Bank. Such an alliance is facilitated by the fact that those 
persons that hold important positions within these sectors often are educated at British or 
American universities and share the economic ideology of the IMF. The IMF can also seek to 
make domestic alliances that include groups outside the usual circle of finance ministry and the 
Central Bank if they are essential to the programme. However, Kahler (1992:128) argues that 
such trans-national alliances are not sufficient for the implementation of a structural adjustment 
programme, it is only viable for reaching an agreement between the IMF and the recipient 
country. According to Kahler, key persons within the government have to agree with IMF 
policies for a successful implementation.  
 
2.5 Summing up my theoretical perspectives 
In this chapter I have presented the theoretical perspectives that I will draw upon in the further 
analysis. I have discussed the issue of state capacity in order to examine how the technical and 
administrative capacities of states influence the implementation process. I have also discussed 
regime capacity that focuses on how the structure of political institutions can influence the 
decisiveness of regimes and how popular support and interest articulation are incorporated in 
political institutions in order to facilitate capacity. In this chapter I finally looked at important 
questions that arise in relation to how national governments handle demands from the IMF to 
                                                 
30 When reforms are being implemented in an intrusive way, the imposition and monitoring of economic policies can 
lead to strong pressures from groups inside as well as outside government to shake off those constraints. This again 
may lower the government’s legitimacy and its ability to implement the required policies.  
 
 
 28
implement reforms. Based on the theoretical arguments (left column) made in this chapter I have 
developed a model where I suggest five empirical questions (the right column) that will guide my 
further analysis.     
  
           Theoretical arguments                               Empirical questions 
Agreement over proper economic reforms 
between the IMF and the recipient 
country 
How did conflict and cooperation between the IMF 
and the recipient government concerning the 
properness of economic reforms manifest itself in the 
implementation process? 
Weberian characteristics of the 
bureaucracy 
How did bureaucratic conditions influence the 
reform implementation in Indonesia and South 
Korea? 
Embedded government and business 
relations 
How did features associated with the relationship 
between the Indonesian and South Korean 
governments and the business sector hinder, or 
promote these governments in implementing IMF 
reforms? 
Political-institutional structures and 
power relations that promote decisive 
government action 
To which degree did the political-institutional 
frameworks in Indonesia and South Korea increase 
the possibility of decisive action in the 
implementation of IMF reforms? 
Incorporation of popular support and 
interest articulation in the political 
institutional structure 
How did the Indonesian and South Korean political 
systems incorporate popular support and interest 
articulation so as to successfully implement reforms?
 
Figure 2 Theoretical arguments and guiding questions 
 
For example, in the first cell in the left column it is claimed that for successful reform 
implementation it is necessary to have a context where there is an agreement between the IMF 
and the recipient government about what the proper economic reforms should be. Thus my 
analysis in Chapter 4 that deals with the context where the interplay between the IMF and the 
Indonesian and South Korean governments takes place, will be centred around the question ‘How 
did conflict and cooperation between the IMF and the recipient government concerning the 
properness of economic reforms manifest itself in the implementation process?’ In the second cell 
in the left column it is stated that Weberian characteristics of the bureaucracy is crucial for 
successful implementation of reforms. Then, my guiding question for the analysis of the 
Indonesian and the South Korean experiences in relation to the issue of bureaucratic organisation 
in Chapter 5 is concerned with ‘How did bureaucratic conditions influence the reform 
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implementation in Indonesia and South Korea?’ The following three empirical questions are 
designed in the same way.  
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CHAPTER 3 ASIAN ECONOMIES: FROM MIRACLE TO CRISIS 
Not many had predicted that the earlier so successful Asian economies would experience serious 
economic problems in the late 1990s. In search for causes of the crisis, a common argument was 
that the crisis was the result of policy failure. Either that the market forces had been allowed to 
govern too much or that the state had intervened too extensively in the economy. In order to 
understand the design of the IMF reforms in Indonesia and South Korea in 1997-98, it is 
necessary to know what the IMF saw as the causes of the crisis, and how they interpreted the 
political economy of the Asian states prior to the crisis in 1997. The present chapter is divided 
into five parts. In the first section I will discuss two different explanations of the ‘Asian miracle’, 
the neo-liberal and the statist. In the second section of this chapter I will discuss features of the 
Asian crisis and show different interpretations of its causes.31 In part three and four I am going to 
show how, and discuss why Indonesia and South Korea were hit by the Asian crisis. In the fifth 
and final part I will sum up the arguments made in this chapter 
 
3.1. The Asian Miracle: Magic ingredients?  
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s the high performance of the Asian economies was usually 
explained in terms of neo-liberal economic theory, with a focus on a growth strategy based on the 
workings of the free market forces (Little 1981, Belassa et al. 1982) The economic growth was 
explained in terms of the response of private entrepreneurs to market stimuli, and the Asian 
states’ comparative advantage with a combination of extensive access to natural resources and a 
hard working, well educated, disciplined and cheap labour force.32 The relevance of export was 
also an important part of the neo-liberalist explanation of the rapid economic growth in the Asian 
region (Balassa 1988:280-281).33 
 
                                                 
31 For a more detailed analysis of various different explanations of the causes of the Asian crisis, see Burkett & Hart-
Landsberg (1998).  
32 A comparative advantage implies that countries produce what is optimal for them in relation to a country’s access to 
raw material and other important resources.            
33 First, export contributed to resource allocation according to the comparative advantage. Gains would cumulate over 
time as the efficiency of new investment was enhanced through its orientation towards industries that relied on the 
comparative advantage. Second, exports enabled the Asian countries to enter the international market when their 
domestic market was too small for an optimal use of resources. Third, national industry had to be innovative to keep up 
with the international trends in the export market. This led to a healthy competition between domestic producers of 
technology that in turn developed the country’s national industry and improved their position to compete in the 
international market. This optimal environment for private enterprise was achieved due to ‘getting the price right’, 
through trade liberalization and exchange rate reform. 
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However, during the 1980s within the tradition of developmental studies and with the increasing 
literature about the developmental state, the explanation of the ‘Asian miracle’ became more state 
oriented.34 The statist perspective emerged as criticism of the neo-liberal explanation. Instead of 
emphasizing the workings of the free market, export and the importance of private enterprise, 
they rather focused on the strategic role of the state in taming international and national market 
forces so as to make them work in ways to reach national ends and to overcome obstacles to 'late 
industrialization'.35 The argument was that the state had successfully intervened in the Asian 
economies through macroeconomic incentives and guided the private sector in order to develop 
successful industrial policies. Economic growth was not seen as the outcome of adjustment to 
naturally given static comparative advantage determined by existing pool of resources, labour 
supply and workers’ skills- rather as a dynamic comparative advantage  
created by the state through its interventions in the market.36  
                                                 
34 In the early 1990s, the intervention by the state in the Asian market was also to a certain degree acknowledged by 
‘mainstream’ theorists, among others represented in the World Bank report ‘The East Asian Miracle’ in 1993. 
35 Late industrialization refers to a situation where state intervention is seen as necessary to overcome the imperfections 
of the free market and the various bottlenecks of industrialization (Amsden 1989). 
36 When one talks about the impressive economic growth in the Asian region before the economic crisis in 1997, the 
impression can be that all the Asian miracle economies have followed the same path to economic growth. However, 
one usually makes a distinction between the first generation of NICs, (-South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore), and the second generation South East Asian NICs, (-Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) An economic 
development based on industrial protection and export was of particular importance to the first generation NICs, 
because their access to natural resources was scarce. The economies of the East Asian states encouraged the systematic 
borrowing of foreign technology, and an important aspect of their industrial policy was the licensing of technology, 
often initiated by the state (Thompson 1996:630). The second generation NICs, adopted a more outward looking 
economic policy. The strong growth rates of the Southeast Asian (SEA) countries were largely based upon primary 
resource export and import substituting industrialisation. Rich natural resource endowments, and the foreign exchange 
earnings arising from their export, enabled the SEA governments to maintain import substitution arrangements for 
much longer than what was the case in resource-poor Taiwan and South Korea. Another important difference between 
the first and second generation NICs relates to the fact that the business community in the SEA states was 
overwhelmingly made up of people with Chinese decent. Due to many instances of official harassment of Chinese 
minorities in these countries, the Chinese have avoided high profile collective political action, and instead relied on 
clientilism as a form of political representation. In return for protection and policy favours, Chinese business people 
provided cash, stocks and company directorships to powerful members of the political elite. The first and second 
generation NICs are also different when it comes to state intervention in the economy. The                                         
Northeast Asian NICs significantly increased the scope for intervention in the market place. Their governments 
intervened extensively in an attempt to guide corporate behaviour and ultimately the pattern of industrial development. 
The SEA states have not attempted to involve themselves in governing the behaviour of firms to a similar extent as the 
first generation NICs. Or if they have, like in the case of Indonesia, intervention has been poorly coordinated and 
subject to extensive manipulation by business people with powerful patrons in the government. The states of the second 
generation NICs also appear much less 'strong' compared to the first generation NICs. The east Asian states were 
known for the ability of the state elite to formulate economic policy without becoming captive to rent seeking activity 
as well as being relatively independent of distributional pressures from business. Both South Korea and Taiwan had 
centrally coordinated and disciplined elite bureaucrats that were less prone to problems of inefficiency, incompetence 
and official corruption. Bureaucratic agencies in the SEA countries have generally appeared to be less competent and 
less disciplined compared to their Northeast Asian counterparts. SEA bureaucracies have not been as insulated from 
distributional pressures nor as coherent and well educated as their counterparts in the first generation NICs. In relation 
to FDIs, the first generation NICs imposed limits on direct foreign investment. Until the 1990s FDIs played a minor 
role in the economic growth in South Korea and a modest role in Taiwan, while FDI played a significant role for 
economic growth and industrialisation in all the three SEA countries. Although foreign capital was important in 
funding rapid industrialisation in South Korea, it primarily took the form of debt rather than equity. Foreign finance and 
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3.2 Asian economic crisis: Tigers adrift  
During the early to mid-1990s there were few signs that the Asian economies would experience 
severe economic distress in the years to come. First, most of the countries in the region were at, 
or near, fiscal balance at the time of the crisis. Monetary policy seemed responsible and the 
government debt was not problematic. Second, with the exception of Thailand, current account 
deficits were not particularly large and the countries in the region had well developed export 
sectors. When Thailand’s government had to devaluate the bath on the 2nd of July 1997, due to 
capital flight and exchange rate speculation, more or less the entire region was soon affected.37 
The crisis spread from Thailand to the Philippines, Taiwan and Hong Kong, before hitting 
Indonesia and Malaysia and finally South Korea and Japan. A better understanding of the crisis in 
Indonesia and South Korea must involve two elements: First, identifying the factors that made 
most of the Asian economies vulnerable to the financial crisis in 1997. Second, exploring how the 
crisis affected Indonesia and South Korea against the background of their previous economic 
development.  
 
3.2.1 Common features of the Asian economies 
As said earlier, there are different explanations to the causes of the economic crisis in Asia in 
1997-1998. However, most literature concerned with the Asian economic crisis agrees that there 
are three common characteristics of the Asian economies that made them more vulnerable to an 
economic crisis. First, there was a strong increase in international capital flows prior to the crisis, 
not only in the form of FDIs and long term bank lending, but also portfolio investment and short 
term bank lending (less than one year maturity). This created a volatile situation where foreign 
investors swiftly could reverse their investments through the non-renewal of loans or selling away 
of securities denominated in the national currency. This made the Asian economies more 
vulnerable to financial panic in 1997, resulting in a sudden withdrawal of investments.38 Second, 
the Asian economies were vulnerable because they had liberalized cross border capital 
movements. Haggard & McIntyre (1998:385) argue that often when countries liberalize their 
                                                                                                                                                 
technology were purchased, but multinational corporations were not admitted in large numbers to set up direct 
operations. 
37 The cause of the devaluation of the bath must be seen in relation to the overvalued exchange rate. The conditions 
prior to the devaluation was a trend in which financial institutions took up loans abroad, then to pursue their lending 
activities in the domestic market at higher interest rates. When the bath came under attack from international traders, 
the government could no longer defend its currency, and the crisis broke.   
38 The scale of destabilisation caused by the panic is indicated by the figures: From a net inflow of USD 93 billion in 
1996, private capital flow into the five most troubled Asian economies turned into a net outflow of USD 12 billion in 
1997 (Bello 1998a). 
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capital accounts, governments do not have the personnel or the capacity to supervise banks 
adequately. Lacking the ability to evaluate risk, believing that they would automatically be 
shielded from it, or simply intoxicated by asset market and investment booms, domestic 
commercial and merchant banks engage in highly risky lending. If foreign lending then slows 
down, banks engage in further risky behaviour in hope to save themselves, and an economic crisis 
is likely to occur.39  Finally, the exchange rate in most of the Asian countries was ‘quasi’ pegged 
to the US dollar, meaning that it was allowed some flexibility in its value. When the dollar 
strengthened its position in 1995-1997, it made the Asian economies more vulnerable to 
speculative attacks from foreign investors. Domestic inflation in a context of quasi-pegged 
exchange rates made Asian exports increasingly uncompetitive in world markets and slowed 
down the economy (Noble & Ravenhill 2000:7).40 
 
3.2.2 Different explanations of the Asian crisis 
When explaining the Asian economic crisis many tend to concentrate on the element of ‘policy 
making’. Either by stressing the negative effects of state intervention in policy implementation, or 
by emphasizing the policy of letting the free market forces govern too much. While agreeing with 
the above mentioned characteristics of the vulnerability of the Asian economies, neo-liberal 
scholars and policymakers, like the IMF, have more or less understood the Asian crisis in terms 
of the inevitable breakdown of economies in which governments attempt to resist the rationality 
of markets (Camdessus 1997). To the neo-liberalists the crisis arose not because governments had 
liberalized their financial systems, but because they had not liberalized them enough. The costs of 
resisting markets had become too highly reflected in the overvalued assets, poor investment 
decisions and burgeoning debt. State intervention in the eyes of neo-liberalists had caused 'Crony 
Capitalism', a system that emphasize political connections rather than the workings of the free 
market. Above all, the system of preferential lending and close ties between the state and the 
                                                 
39 However, even though the institutions are capable of managing the liberalisation, a problem can occur when the 
outstanding foreign debt is bigger than the total currency reserves, as was the case in Indonesia, Thailand and South 
Korea prior to the crisis (Radelet & Sachs 1998).  
40 Most governments found it impossible to protect local economies from the impact of increased inflows of foreign 
capital. With currency restrictions ruled out and capital inflow fed into the money supply, this fuelled inflationary 
pressures. Financial institutions and other borrowers had little incentive to insure against the exchange risk when 
borrowing in foreign currencies, because of their fixed exchange rate of their home countries. Hedging their loans 
would have cut considerably into their profit margins, but unhedged borrowing might put the entire financial system at 
risk when the exchange rate depreciated. Domestic financial institutions were simply unable to service their loans. It 
has also been argued that the level of short term debt in relation to foreign exchange reserves was one reason why the 
crisis was much worse in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand than in the Philippines and Malaysia, which had 
implemented a series of reforms in the financial sector to avoid this from happening.  
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business sector had to be dissolved because it had explicitly encouraged businesses to engage in 
excessively risky behaviours.  
 
While the neo-liberalists explained the Asian crisis in terms of state intervention causing a 
distorted ‘free market’, others rather focused on the role of international finance, especially the 
activities of the international traders, and the premature liberalization of domestic capital markets 
as causes of the Asian economic crisis. These arguments are based on the observation that when 
important banking institutions withdrew their loans they caused a capital flight and a following 
decrease in the exchange rate. This again caused panic among the international financial actors, 
where the only rational action became to withdraw their loans. The economic crisis was explained 
as being a result of the inability of the governments to regulate capital inflows rather than 
excessive investment caused by moral hazard. The main cause of the crisis, as for example the 
statists saw it, was the hasty liberalisation process in the 1990s that had ruined the institutional 
foundation that was needed for the government to continue its successful developmental state 
strategy and to meet the challenges that global finance and international trading brought (Chang 
1998b). The statist approach agreed that the Asian governments had done some errors prior to the 
crisis, but they still argued that state intervention was needed in order to control international 
finance to avoid crises like the one witnessed in 1997.   
 
3.3 The Indonesian experience: From go-go to yo-yo 
In the third section of this chapter I will discuss how and why Indonesia was hit by the Asian 
economic crisis. The architects of Suharto’s New Order government defined their main mission 
as the need to re-establish order in the Indonesian society when they officially gained power in 
1966.41 The experience with parliamentary democracy in the 1950s and the misled economic 
development under president Sukarno had convinced many in the military of the need for a much 
stronger government (Schwarz 1994:28). To Suharto and the new powerful military leaders, 
economic development and political ‘order’ were seen as two sides of the same coin. Thus, the 
state gained complete control over political and economic resources in order to achieve material 
development. During Suharto’s New Order regime a narrow elite, composed primarily of a small 
number of military officers, ruled Indonesia. Its dependent supporters were Chinese business 
partners and members of the administrative corps. The role of foreign aid reinforced the narrow 
support-base of the New Order regime, because external resources were channelled directly to the 
                                                 
41 Suharto led a military coup in 1965, but he officially gained power when he (with the assistance of the army) moved 
in and effectively deposing Sukarno in mid-March 1966. 
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state elites, and the state did not have to rely on the general population for revenues. The elite 
business linkages and the clientilistic considerations controlled the government’s policies even 
when initiated by technocrats.42 Suharto's New Order regime from 1966 until 1997 experienced 
economic growth largely due to oil revenues, generous foreign aid and the location advantage of 
being part of an increasingly integrated and rapidly growing region.43  
 
Indonesia had prior to the Asian crisis carried out two earlier programmes of economic 
stabilization. The first was from the early start of the Suharto regime in 1966 set to handle 
hyperinflation, currency collapse and bankruptcy of the country's banking system. With renewed 
support from foreign creditors these stabilization policies were successful. The second 
programme of stabilization was initiated 1983 and accelerated in 1988-89. The reason for the 
poor economic performance at this time was the collapse in oil prices and pressure from foreign 
donors and balance of payment crisis in 1983 and 1986. The financial reforms consisted of 
deregulation and liberalization, and included the liberalization of freed interest rates, the end of 
subsidized lending, elimination of branching restrictions for domestic banks, and the diminished 
role of the state banks. However, during the 1990s worries had been expressed regarding the 
micro-economic conditions of the Indonesian economy, especially the prevalence of a special 
treatment for a relatively small number of conglomerates owned by members of the first family 
and their close associates. It was known that these companies did not have to compete for prime 
government contracts, because they were already granted more or less exclusive access to 
important areas of economic activity and admission to cheap funds from the state banks.  
 
3.3.1 Different explanations of why Indonesia was hit 
McLeod (1999:234) argues that the main reason for the Indonesian economic crisis was that the 
Indonesian government had intervened in the foreign exchange market as a buyer to prevent 
exchange rate appreciation from happening. McLeod claims that this kind of intervention was 
unsustainable, because through becoming a large borrower of foreign exchange in the domestic 
market, the Central Bank forced private sector borrowers abroad, thus encouraging more capital 
inflow, which in its turn compelled the Central Bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
                                                 
42 Patron-Client relations are based on mutual personal exchange of goods and services between unequal partners. 
Political clientilism is often associated with bosses and officials that offer favourable treatment to business and large 
landowners and receive economic and political support in return (Törnquist 1999:57).  
43 Since the 1980s the annual economic growth in Indonesia had been about 8% and inflation average was under 6%, 
the budget was carefully watched and the exchange rate maintained its slow and controlled depreciation of about 4% a 
year. The only issue of worry was the growing foreign debt, especially short-term debt. 
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to prevent the rupiah (the Indonesian currency) from appreciating. As a result, Indonesia's 
international reserves increased enormously during the 1990s. Private sector's foreign borrowing 
was unnecessarily increased as a result. Another important issue referred to in neo-liberal 
explanations of the Indonesian crisis was the issue of moral hazard in the bank sector. The 
argument was that the lack of regulations, like for example bankruptcy laws, and the extensive 
preferential lending led to a situation where banks paid little attention to risk. Private enterprises 
did not have enough information or alternatives to withdrawing deposits in banks that engaged in 
risky lending behaviour. As a consequence, there was a deterioration of the financial system. 
Along these lines was also the argument that crony capitalism and widespread corruption was an 
important cause of the crisis in Indonesia.44  
 
Alternatives to the neo-liberal perspective saw the liberalisation process in the 1980s where 
business and financial sectors expanded with few restrictions on their activity, as the main cause 
of the economic crisis in Indonesia. Due to the collapse in oil prices in the mid 1980s the 
government relaxed restrictions on foreign investment and ownership, lowering trade barriers and 
deregulated banking and finance sectors. The former public monopolies were transferred to 
private hands, mainly to Chinese businessmen but also to an increasing extent involving members 
of the Suharto family. Protected from international competition by restrictive trade, licensing and 
investment policies and guaranteed privileged access to state funds and facilities, the powerful 
Suharto family and their followers could extend their activities from forestry and trade into 
manufacturing industry, property and oil distribution. Banking systems and capital markets were 
also liberalised to accommodate new private sector interests. While the liberalisation reforms in 
the 1980s were applauded by the international financial community, some claimed that these 
reforms ‘contained the seed for Indonesia’s present economic crisis’ (Robison & Rosser 
1998:1598). By the early 1990s Indonesia had one of the most liberalised banking systems in the 
world, and the lack of legal framework and supervisory capacity in the financial sector were seen 
as major contributors to the crisis in 1997-98 (Pincus & Ramli 1998:725). Especially the increase 
in non-performing loans was important in this matter, where well-connected conglomerates were 
able to raise large loans from state banks by colluding with state bank officials and then avoided 
                                                 
44 However, worth noting is that there were no obvious breaks in the general direction of policy in 1997 and 
most investors knew the corruption beforehand. The argument that crony capitalism was the major cause of 
the crisis needs an answer to the question of why the corruption in the Indonesian economy was tolerable 
for the investors in July but suddenly not in August the same year.  
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paying them.45 Moreover, because prudential banking regulations were weak, many private banks 
were able to concentrate their lending on other companies within the same groups (Robison & 
Rosser 1998:1599). The extensive deregulation in the 1980s and early 1990s had left the 
government with few remaining instruments to manage the economy and adjust to external 
shocks. Having surrendered control over capital movements, interest rates, credit creation and to a 
large extent fiscal policy, the monetary authorities were left with interest rates on the Central 
Bank’s securities and the exchange rate as main levers of macroeconomic adjustment. This lack 
of control over monetary policy was seen by many as the cause of the crisis and used to explain 
the inability of the Indonesian government to manage the crisis (Pinkus & Ramli 1998:731).  
 
3.4 The South Korean experience: The shattered miracle 
In the fourth section of this chapter I will discuss how and why South Korea was hit by the Asian 
economic crisis. The political and economic development in South Korea has often been referred 
to as a coalition between the state and the Chaebols (large South Korean business conglomerates), 
where the state gave the Chaebols access to economic rents in exchange for political donations. 
Since the 1960s the South Korean economy had been growing fast. After the military coup in 
1961 there was a centralization of the economic management, and the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) was established.46 Its main task was to define and plan policies in accordance with national 
economic goals. Its centrality in hierarchical interministerial co-ordination as well as its control 
over the budget and monetary policy allowed EPB and the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
(MOFE) to exert vast power over economic decision-making. As said earlier, an important 
feature of the developmental state, and accordingly also the South Korean state, was the co-
operation between the private sector and state officials in working towards a common national 
goal. State control over important sources of subsidy, especially cheap credit from the state 
controlled bank, allowed the state to discipline the Chaebols.  Productive investment was 
rewarded through access to cheap credit and tariff protection, while poor performance was 
penalized by withholding these goods.  During the 1970s and 1980s the state orchestrated large 
private firms towards heavy and chemical industrialization involving steel, non-ferrous metals, 
petrochemicals, machinery, automobiles, shipbuilding and electronics. The state gave priority to 
                                                 
45 According to World Bank estimates (1997:128) non-performing loans exceeded 12 billion dollars. 
46 Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president was removed by a military 'revolution' in 1961, followed by Park 
Chung Hee in 1964. Park was assassinated in 1979 and another military coup in 1980 placed Chun Doo Hwan in the 
presidency. 
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implementation of industrial reforms and economic growth, rather than creating economic 
stability and redistribution.   
 
By the 1990s two major changes are worth noting in relation to the South Korean economic 
development. First, in the beginning of the 1990s the EPB in South Korea was increasingly 
marginalized and finally abolished in 1993 (but later absorbed into the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy) due to continuing disagreements with the MOFE about the government’s wish for 
capital market opening. The weakening of the bureaucrats’ influence and the liberalisation of the 
economy in the 1990s were seen by many as a sign that the South Korean developmental state 
was in decline. Second, the Chaebols gradually assumed a more independent position towards the 
state beginning in the late 1980s. This was due to the increasing internationalisation of finance, 
which eased the access to international funding for the big South Korean companies, and they 
were no longer reliant of access to state-allocated finance. In 1996 South Korea experienced 
decrease in export, followed by a worsening of its current account position.47 However, the 
current account deficit began to lessen in the first half of 1997, and in June South Korea showed a 
trade surplus. By mid 1997 fundamental problems in the economy, like over-investment by major 
business groups and the accumulation of non-performing loans by financial institutions surfaced. 
There was a closedown of one of South Korea's powerful Chaebols, the Hanbo, in January 1997, 
an episode that many interpreted as a sign that the South Korean economy was in serious distress.  
When the Asian crisis hit the South East Asian countries during the summer of 1997, South 
Korea experienced a substantial capital flight and suffered a severe liquidity crunch. American 
and European banks failed to roll over short-term debts and the collapse in stock prices 
constrained the ability of banks in Japan to extend credit. In December 1997 South Korea had to 
ask the IMF to provide a USD 57 billion rescue package.48  
3.4.1 Different explanations of why South Korea was hit 
If the real economy in South Korea was relatively sound at the time when the crisis broke, why 
was South Korea affected? According to the statist approach, the reason for the crisis in South 
Korea was the weakened state capacity in relation to bureaucratic organization and the ability of 
                                                 
47 The slowing of export was caused by the yen starting to depreciate against the US Dollar in 1995, and as the South 
Korean won was tied closely to the dollar, this eroded the competitiveness of Koran exports. The price of 
semiconductors also played a particularly important role in the second half of 1996, as nearly a quarter of South Korea's 
total export consisted of semiconductor devices. 
48 The package consisted of USD 21 billion in IMF loans, a 10 billion loan from the World Bank, and a 20 billion back-
up loan from other industrial nations (10 billions from Japan and 5 billions from the US, and 5 billions from other loans 
including one from Asian Development Bank, ADB). 
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the government to allocate finance in order to direct the business sector towards desired national 
goals. The statists argue that the most important cause of the economic crisis in South Korea was 
that the state bureaucracy had lost its centrality in directing the long-term sectoral industrial 
policy and overseeing the economic development. The bureaucratic segmentation had led to 
inconsistent policy management, seen in the mismanagement of the cases concerning the Hanbo 
‘scandal’ and the nationalisation of the KIA Chaebol.49 The statist approach argues that the 
bureaucracy’s capacity to rapidly implement policies had diminished because of the changes 
within the state apparatus that left the South Korean state in a large degree of distress when faced 
with the economic crisis in 1997. Another important explanation for the statists was that the 
earlier so effective developmental state had in their eyes been reduced because of a poorly 
designed liberalization process that had been implemented after Kim Young Sam came in office. 
The state had lost its control over the financial allocation that had enabled the South Korean state 
so successfully to direct the business sector towards desired goals. The deregulation in the 
financial sector included interest rate deregulation, abolition of policy loans, granting of more 
managerial autonomy to the banks, reduction of entry barriers to financial activities and most 
important substantial capital account liberalization (Chang 1998b:439). With the drastic 
relaxation of regulations regarding foreign borrowing, especially short-term borrowing, the South 
Korean banks and financial institutions engaged in rapid massive foreign borrowing. The South 
Korean currency had been overvalued since 1995 as a means to control the inflation, because 
currency devaluation would make debt repayment unbearable.  
 
On the other hand, the more neo-liberal oriented explanations see the immediate causes of the 
South Korean crisis as due to corruption, crony capitalism and nepotism. The Hanbo and the KIA 
cases showed a close connection between the state, Chaebols and banks that had given rise to 
problems of moral hazard. Preferential lending, where the government decided which firms that 
were allowed loans in order to encourage industrialization within certain sectors, was seen as bad, 
because the government treated banks as tools for its industrial policy, directing them to lend to 
favored sectors of the economy at cheap rates (The Economist 1998). Thus political lending 
                                                 
49 The Hanbo Chaebol was South Korea's 14th biggest industry company, and when the company went bankrupt in 
January 1997, it revealed a web of corruption involving bank loan decisions that involved some of president Kim 
Young Sam’s close aides and his son. (None of them were later officially charged for corruption with regard to the 
'Hanbo scandal'.) The Kim Young Sam government also showed indecisiveness in relation to its decisions about the 
fate of KIA, another big Chaebol. The question was whether the larger Samsung Chaebol (where the president and his 
family had economic interests) would buy up KIA, or whether it would be nationalised. After a time of back and forth 
decision-making, the government nationalized KIA.  
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became an obstacle to a free and healthy competition between equal partners. The firms had also 
come to expect the government to bail them out if needed, which again encouraged them to 
borrow too much and to invest recklessly.  
 
3.5 Summing up the chapter 
This chapter has attempted to shed some light on the causes of the economic growth and 
subsequent crisis in Asia. The aim has been to provide a better understanding of the design of the 
IMF reforms in Indonesia and South Korea.     According to neo-liberals, the Asian ‘miracle’ was 
the result of the workings of free market forces. Others pointed to the strategic role of the state in 
taming international and national market forces as the most important ingredients in the Asian 
miracle. Similarly, there are different explanations of the Asian economic crisis. Neo-liberalists 
argued that the main cause of the crisis was that the liberalisation process had not been allowed to 
go far enough. Instead state intervention had created a ‘distorted’ free market that was unable to 
function as it should. From a ‘statist’ point of view the blame was put on the liberalisation 
process. As it turned out the state and the political and economic institutions were unable to 
control the effects of global finance and international trading. In the final part of this chapter I 
discussed how and why Indonesia and South Korea were hit by the crisis, and showed different 
explanations of the causes of the crisis in these two countries.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: THE IMF PROVIDING A BITTER 
MEDICINE FOR SICK TIGERS? 
As discussed in the previous chapter the IMF saw the causes of the Asian crisis as being due to 
flaws inherent in the structures of the Asian economies with its tight relationship between the 
state and the business sector. Common for the assistance from the IMF to both Indonesia and 
South Korea was that it was accompanied by demands for limits upon state budgets, and that the 
reforms in both countries aimed at breaking up the tight relationship between the state and the 
business sector. In the Indonesian package there was emphasis on dissolving private and state 
monopolies and strengthening governance. In the South Korean IMF package the focus was on 
forcing open the capital accounts, breaking up the patterns of cooperation between the banks, 
government and Chaebols within the framework of industry policy, as well as implementing 
reforms that aimed at increasing the ‘flexibility of the workforce’ (IMF 1999a).  
 
When discussing how national political factors influence the implementation of IMF reforms, it is 
crucial to explore the context where the interaction between the IMF and the recipient country 
takes place. This chapter is concerned with an analysis of the contextual framework where the 
interplay between the IMF and the recipient governments takes place, within which the further 
implementation process has to be understood. As said earlier concerning structural adjustment 
programmes, the recipient country’s government often experiences a dilemma because it on the 
one hand seeks to recover from the crisis through the assistance of the IMF, and on the other hand 
has to deal with the social, political and economic consequences of the required reforms that can 
generate political and social instability. To gain a better understanding of the reform 
implementation processes in Indonesia and South Korea during the Asian crisis, I have chosen to 
focus on this dilemma in this chapter. The guiding question for the analysis in this chapter is: 
How did conflict and cooperation between the IMF and the recipient government concerning the 
properness of economic reforms manifest itself in the implementation process? In the case of 
Indonesia I will discuss Suharto’s dilemma of how to adhere to the IMF reforms at a certain level 
so as to secure the IMF bailout and to restore investors’ confidence in the Indonesian economy, 
while at the same time considering the outcome of the reforms for his own family’s economic 
interests as well as the socio-political effects of the reforms. In South Korea the dilemma between 
adhering to the IMF reforms and taking national considerations was not as obvious as in the 
Indonesian case. The main reason was that the South Korean government under Kim Dae Jung 
and the IMF had relatively similar understandings of the South Korean economic crisis and to a 
 42
large degree shared the view on how to best restructure the South Korean economy. However, 
Kim Dae Jung experienced a dilemma when he was faced with the task of restructuring the 
workforce. Not only did he have to increase the ‘flexibility of the workforce’ as the IMF required. 
He also had to accommodate the labour unions in order to avoid serious strikes that would further 
damage the economy.  
 
As I said in the introduction, most of my analysis will be centred around a discussion of the 
Indonesian case. This chapter consists of five parts where the three first parts will be concerned 
with the Indonesian experience, while the last part will explore the South Korean case. In part 4.1 
I will show which reforms the IMF required implemented in Indonesia, and see how Suharto 
handled the above mentioned dilemma in relation to the implementation of these reforms. In part 
4.2 I will be looking more closely at how the Indonesian government expressed ideological 
resistance to IMF’s prescriptions, as the reforms clearly contradicted with their views of what the 
proper economic reforms should be. In part 4.3 I will explore how Suharto in some respect 
challenged the authority of the IMF in order to avoid the perception that he was willing to 
subordinate national considerations to external interests. In the fourth part of this chapter I will 
briefly describe the IMF reforms in South Korea and discuss how the South Korean case relates 
to the dilemma of facilitating implementation of IMF reforms and taking national considerations 
at the same time. In the final part of this chapter I will summarise the arguments made in this 
chapter and see how they relate to the question proposed above.  
 
4.1 Struggles over economic policy 
In the first part of this chapter I will present the reforms that the IMF required implemented in 
Indonesia in 1997-98. I have structured this part into sections that cover each of the three IMF 
rescue packages in Indonesia from October 1997 until May 1998. After each section I will 
examine Suharto’s dilemma in relation to the implementation of relevant IMF reforms, as the 
required reforms clearly contradicted both with national considerations and the president’s private 
economic interests.  
 
4.1.1 The first reform package 
When the IMF entered the scene in Indonesia in October 1997 it was with an understanding of the 
Asian and Indonesian crisis as something being caused by structural errors in the Asian 
economies, largely due to state intervention in the economy. The Indonesian rescue package 
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consisted of 43 billion USD in international assistance and was shared between the IMF, Japan, 
Singapore, the USA, Malaysia, Australia, Brunei, China and Hong Kong. The IMF contributed 23 
billion USD and as a condition for their assistance they required a number of economic and 
structural reforms in the financial and corporate sector.50  
 
The aim of the first IMF program for Indonesia was not only to restrain budget expenditure and 
close insolvent financial institutions, but also to ‘dismantle frameworks of industry policy and 
state control within which collusive relationships between banks, the government and business 
were established and networks of cronyism sustained’ (IMF 1999a).51 The programme included 
(a) trade policy reforms with trade deregulation for various commodities via the elimination of 
BULOG’s (The Indonesian National Logistics Agency) monopoly on wheat, wheat flour, 
soybeans and garlic by January the 1st 1998; (b) A gradual reduction of import tariffs on chemical 
products, iron and steel, and fisheries products; (c) Industry policy reform, such as the elimination 
of local content programme for automobiles by year 2000 and the implementation of the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) decision concerning the Indonesian National Car project by 2000;52 
(d) Macroeconomic policy targets for economic growth, the inflation rate, current account deficits 
and fiscal balance, as well as the restructuring of financial institutions; (e) Fiscal measures 
included cutting low priority expenditures, including postponing or rescheduling major state 
enterprise infrastructure projects, removing government subsidies, eliminating VAT exemptions, 
and adjusting administered prices including the prices of electricity and petroleum products 
(Sharma 2001).53  
 
                                                 
50 The entire agreement was to be implemented over a period of three years and would be carefully monitored by the 
Indonesian government and the IMF including experts from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB).  
 
51 The Letter of Intent (LOI) signed on 31. October 1997 included 48 policy measures that the Indonesian government 
had agreed to implement.  
52 WTO was investigating the Indonesian National car project to see if it was against their regulations, because the cars, 
called Timor, were manufactured in South Korea but was exempt from payment of import and luxury taxes. This 
allowed the Timor to undercut the prices of its Japanese, American and other competitors on the Indonesian car market. 
Moreover, to boost the sale of the car, the public sector was required to purchase it (New York Times 1998b).  
53 The most important component of the IMF package was the commitment to restructuring the financial sector, and 
especially to 'clean up' the banking sector. This included the closing down of insolvent banks, some partly owned by 
members of the Indonesian president’s family. The aim was to distinguish among banks that were merely illiquid and 
those that were fundamentally insolvent with high non-performing ratios. The structural reforms also aimed at 
increasing competition in the banking sector, through making it easier for foreign investors to invest through lifting the 
restrictions on foreign owned banks and foreign ownership of local banks. New banking laws were required to increase 
disclosure requirements and to rationalize prudential regulations and penalties.   
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4.1.1.1 Suharto’s dilemma 
There were three incidents in relation to the first IMF agreement that showed Suharto’s dilemma 
of taking national considerations while also implementing IMF reforms. First, that on November 
the 1st Suharto signed a decree giving green light to eight of the large state funded projects that 
were postponed in September in order to reduce public spending. These projects were not 
explicitly prohibited under the IMF package, but the fact that they were allowed to go ahead were 
interpreted as a sign that Suharto was not fully committed to implementing the IMF reforms. The 
act was further controversial because all of the rescued projects were joint ventures between the 
state and close business associates of president Suharto. Besides, Suharto declined to abolish the 
Indonesian National Car project, nor was the IMF able to persuade the Indonesian government to 
abolish IPTN’s costly jet airplane project, although the government had agreed to ‘review the 
investment and expenditure for state-owned enterprises, and strategic industries’54 (Asiaweek 
1998). 
 
The second incident that showed Suharto’s dilemma was when he prioritised family interests over 
IMF requirements in a controversial bank restructuring. On the 1st of November, less than twenty-
four hours after reaching the agreement with the IMF, the Indonesian government abruptly 
suspended the operating licences of the sixteen banks, in effect, closing them down. However, 
closing banks in the middle of an economic crisis can be a risky strategy, because it can signal to 
foreign investors that the government lacks supervision of the national banks, and further cause a 
bank panic that deteriorates the confidence in the economy. It soon became clear that this 
happened in the Indonesian case, and from an internal IMF note later leaked to the press, the IMF 
was aware that their criteria for bank closures had not been very well articulated (New York 
Times 1998a). Sharma (2001) argues that the problem was not the closure of these weak banks 
per se, but the manner in which it was done. The agreement that was negotiated between the IMF 
and the Indonesian government said that there were 50 banks that would be closed down. The 
problem was that after the closing of the initial 16 banks, the remaining 34 were not identified, 
which created uncertainty among the general public regarding which banks would be next. As for 
Suharto, he agreed to close down the banks in order to show his commitment to the IMF and to 
attract foreign investors back to Indonesia. The fact that three of the 16 banks belonged to the 
Suharto family just reinforced the picture that he was willing to take measures even against his 
                                                 
54 IPTN stands for Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara and is the state-owned Indonesian aircraft manufacturer that 
was established in 1976, created and run by B.J. Habibie, then Research and Technology Minister and later following 
Suharto as president in May 1998.  
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own family.55 A few days after the closing of the banks, Suharto’s son Bambang, and Suharto’s 
half brother said that they would sue both the Central Bank governor and the Minister of Finance 
for closing down their banks. Suharto’s dilemma was clear when Bambang, after losing his Bank 
Andromeda, was permitted to reopen his bank, although under a new name, Bank Alfa.56 Suharto 
later justified Bambang’s ‘re-opening’ by arguing that his son had not been responsible for the 
misdeeds of the closed down bank. However, Probosutejo, Suharto’s step brother, was not able to 
re-open his bank because the High Court issued a letter demanding that the earlier approval for a 
new bank made by the Jakarta State Administrative Court, had to be cancelled (Robison & Rosser 
1998). 
 
The third incident that showed Suharto’s dilemma was the release of the annual budget in January 
1998. The IMF required a 1% surplus, a demand that many have argued was unrealistic due to 
decline in the spending power caused by the economic crisis. Suharto had to deal with the IMF 
requirement of 1% surplus in the budget in the midst of a serious economic crisis. On the one 
hand he had to show his adherence to the IMF reforms in order to attract foreign investors and to 
restore faith in the Indonesian economy. On the other hand, it was clear that these demands would 
imply two things: First, that in the current economic climate, a contractionary budget would force 
many Indonesian companies, including some owned by the president’s family and his close 
business associates, into bankruptcy. Second, that unless current levels of spending on items such 
as food and fuel subsidies were maintained, there might be an increase in rioting, demonstrations 
and other forms of social unrest as a reaction to increased fuel and food prices. Suharto’s 
dilemma was clear; if he chose to follow IMF requirements concerning the annual budget, the 
economy might recover, but it would also imply that he would harm both his own business 
interests as well as taking the risk of causing social and political unrest. If he chose to take 
national considerations and oppose the IMF requirements, he reinforced the perception that he 
was not committed to the IMF reforms. When Suharto announced the budget he referred to 
substantial increases in state subsidies for petrol, rice and fertilizer and an overall 32% increase in 
government spending. He gave no hint of how the government would manage the slashing in 
subsides that the IMF required. Suharto prioritised national considerations, which caused a 
massive fall in the value of rupiah from 7,000 to 10,000 to the USD just within two days. The 
international response to the annual budget that Suharto presented was negative and international 
                                                 
55 Of the closed down banks Bank Industri was owned by Suharto’s daughter Siti Hediati Prabowo, Bank Jakarta was 
partially owned by Suharto’s half brother Probosutejo, and Bank Andromeda belonged to Suharto’s son Bambang 
(Tommy) Trihatmodjo. 
56 Bambang used the same building and same employees as he had with Bank Andromeda. He also received a new 
foreign exchange licence issued by the Central Bank. 
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observers questioned whether the Indonesian president understood the seriousness of the 
economic crisis that was unfolding.57  
 
4.1.2 The second reform package 
When the second IMF package was negotiated in mid January 1998, the Indonesian economy was 
in greater distress than in October, and the Indonesian government faced a strong international 
demand that they had to adhere to the IMF reforms. The IMF also increased its pressure on the 
Indonesian government, and Stanley Fisher, senior deputy head of the IMF said that the Fund 
‘would like to accelerate the program and strengthen it, because a lot of people believe that the 
Indonesian government is not really committed to the program’ (Bresnan 1999:93). The second 
IMF programme was revised in comparison to the first, where fiscal policy was adjusted to 
accommodate the continuing crisis. Given the sharp depreciation of the rupiah and the 
deterioration of the economy, it was no longer feasible to aim at a surplus of 1% of GDP. The 
second IMF agreement settled for a deficit at 1% of GDP. The main focus of the second IMF 
rescue package was: (a) Structural reforms aiming to dismantle cartels, monopolies, and taxes 
that directly benefited Suharto, his family and his business associates. The IMF continued its 
demand that the Indonesian government had to cancel 12 major infrastructure projects that had 
been restrained in November, as well as the withdrawal of taxation privileges to the National Car 
Project and for the IPTN’s jet airline projects; (b) The abolition of state trading monopolies in 
flour, sugar, soybeans and other basic commodities, as well as limiting the monopoly of BULOG 
solely to rice distribution.58 In addition, the IMF required a phased elimination of subsidies for 
fuel and electricity, and an elimination of the clove monopoly;59 (c) Bank and corporate sector 
restructuring, including subsequent announcement of a process to put in place a framework for 
creditors and debtors to deal on a voluntary, case by case basis with the external debt problems of 
Indonesian corporations. A new regulatory body for the banking industry, the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA), was established under a presidential decree for a period of five 
                                                 
57 An important objection against the 1998 budget that Suharto presented was that the calculations regarding the 
exchange, inflation and growth rate as well as the oil prices were seen as quite unrealistic. The exchange rate was 
stipulated to 4,000 rupiah to the USD, while the currency was already 7,500 to the USD when the budget was issued. A 
4% GDP growth rate was also calculated, despite analysts’ predictions of  3%-5% contraction and a 9% inflation rate 
(Far Eastern Economic Review 1998c). 
 
58 The aim was to deregulate domestic trade in agricultural production, eliminating restrictive market arrangements and 
measures to alleviate the suffering caused by the drought. 
59 Cloves are an important spice in Indonesia as they are the key ingredient in the country's distinctive 
kretek cigarettes. The second package also contained a great deal of liberalization of both trade and foreign investment. 
The IMF reforms also included demands to establish proper bidding processes for government contracts, and to adopt 
transparent means of evaluating unsolicited private sector proposals for projects funded or supported by the 
government.   
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years.60 According to the IMF reforms the Central Bank was also to be given independence in 
formulating and implementing monetary policies. With regard to finance, the restrictions on 
foreign investment in the wholesale and the retail trade were to be removed.  
 
Despite the broad scope of the second IMF program the rupiah started to slide again. McLeod 
(1999:226) argues that this was inevitable, because the second IMF package only consisted of 
reforms of secondary importance. He argues that the most crucial question that needed answering 
was whether the international investors’ loans were going to be repaid in full and on time. 
Nothing in the second IMF package provided any concrete solutions to the immediate problems 
of banking and currency crisis. It mainly focused on structural reforms rather than fiscal matters.  
 
4.1.2.1 Suharto’s dilemma 
When the second Letter Of Intent had been signed in January 1998, president Suharto personally 
conducted the negotiation. Djiwandono (2000:63) argues that the president chose to deal with the 
IMF himself because he had become impatient with the way the crisis was developing, and also 
because he no longer trusted the Central Bank governor or the Minister of Finance. Due to the 
massive fall in the value of rupiah, president Suharto started to investigate the possibility to create 
a currency board.61 The idea of establishing a currency board system must be seen in relation to 
the dilemma Suharto was experiencing. The IMF reforms had failed to restore the investors’ 
confidence in the Indonesian economy. So what were Suharto’s options? If he still wanted to 
secure his own economic interests, it was not likely that he could do so and implement the IMF 
reforms at the same time. A currency board appeared as a way for Suharto to stabilise the rupiah 
in order to make investors return without the help of the IMF. Prior to the economic crisis it had 
not been any hinder for investors that an interventionist state and an authoritarian president 
dominated the Indonesian political and economic system. If the government could convince 
investors that political stability would be guaranteed, and assure profitable investments, the 
Indonesian economy could recover without implementing the IMF reforms. However, 
international observers saw the currency board proposal as a sign that the president was searching 
for a simple solution to stabilize the rupiah without tackling the structural problems of the 
                                                 
60 IBRA was to be an ‘independent’ agency, reporting to the Minister of Finance. Its mandate was to restructure the 
banking sector, through taking over and rehabilitating weak banks and administering the government’s guarantee 
program for bank debts. IBRA started by taking over 14 banks, seven large and seven small banks. The bank takeovers 
were applauded by the IMF and described as ‘a difficult and courageous action that also demonstrated political 
independence as well as operational capacity’ (IMF 1998c). 
61 This means that the rupiah would be tied rigidly to USD and the government would have no independent monetary 
policy at all. The currency board would have to buy or sell USD at the specified peg rate, regardless of the effect that 
these transactions would have on the money supply. 
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economy (FEER 1998b). Although the bill favouring a currency board was already drafted by a 
number of Bank Indonesia (The Indonesian Central Bank) officials and senior officials from the 
ministry of Finance, Suharto abandoned the idea due to considerable international pressure that 
urged Indonesia to adhere to the IMF-supported programme. 
 
In addition to the controversy surrounding the currency board proposal, Suharto’s commitment to 
the IMF seemed at an even lower level, as it became obvious that he did not implement the 
required reforms that targeted monopolies that belonged to his business associates. He had 
officially said that he would do so, but it soon appeared that the cartels and the monopolies were 
still operating.62  
 
4.1.3 The third rescue package  
A third round of negotiations between the IMF and the Indonesian government started on the 17th 
of March 1998. The IMF was now more flexible in their demands for two reasons. First, the IMF 
had been challenged by Suharto’s attempt to establish a currency board, which gave Suharto an 
opportunity to enhance his position towards the IMF (FEER 1998a). Second, as the crisis 
unfolded it was clear that Suharto was facing domestic problems with rising prices on basic 
necessities (especially rice), due to the earlier removal of some of the subsidies and the increased 
import costs. This created a situation that could easily drift into social unrest, and gave Suharto 
strength in his claim that the IMF should revise its policies towards Indonesia. One of the 
previous requirements of the IMF was that the Indonesian government had to cut tariffs on over 
500 food items to a maximum of 5%. However, now Suharto was allowed to continue the 
subsidies on imports of basic commodities and to keep BULOG in existence. The IMF was also 
agreeing on a budget deficit of 3.2% of GDP (Sharma 2001). As regards fiscal matters, the aim of 
the reforms in the third package was still to develop a strong monetary policy to ensure 
stabilisation of the rupiah. When it came to financial restructuring, IBRA was to continue its take-
over and closure of weak or unviable financial institutions.63  
 
                                                 
62 Like his close friend Bob Hasan’s plywood cartel that still operated through its control of exporters dependent on the 
cartel for services in plywood shipping. For timber companies it was difficult to operate outside the plywood cartel and 
they continued to pay fees and adhere to the cartel’s pricing policies, even though this was against the IMF reforms 
requiring that no firms should pay fees or commissions to a joint marketing organization (IMF 1998b).  
63 They were also allowed to issue bonds to finance the restoration of financial viability to qualified financial 
institutions and to eliminate existing foreign ownership restrictions on banks and they issued a new bankruptcy law.   
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Even though the IMF had been more flexible in their demands in the third rescue package, there 
was still a comprehensive agenda for structural reforms. Reforms included measures to increase 
competition and efficiency in the economy, reinforcing the commitments made in January and 
including further privatisation of six major state enterprises and the identification of seven new 
enterprises for privatisation in 1998/99. The IMF also required that state-owned shares would be 
available to private investment in six listed companies, the privatisation of seven other state-
owned enterprises within twelve months, the ending of allocation of monopoly privileges, the 
introduction of new commercial court laws, as well as liberalisation of trade and foreign 
ownership in wholesale and palm oil exports.   
 
4.1.3.1. Suharto’s dilemma 
One of the objections to most IMF structural adjustment programmes has been the lack of 
concern for the consequences of groups in the society that have been worst hit by the crisis. In 
Indonesia, an important component of the third IMF program concerned subsidy cuts that had 
serious social consequences. On the 1st of April the price of sugar, wheat flour, corn, soybeans 
and fishmeal was increased because of the gradual ending of subsidies that was to be completed 
by October the 1st 1998. The required cuts in subsidies of fuel and electricity prices were left less 
precise and it was not clear whether the IMF wanted the measures to be implemented 
incrementally or at once. The Suharto government implemented the measures at once on the 4th of 
May, which led to an increase of 70 % in the price of gasoline and severely affecting the vast 
majority of Indonesians. Suharto’s quick action was interpreted as an indication that he was under 
strong pressure and needed to adhere to IMF demands. Others regarded the removal of fuel 
subsides as an attempt to improve the economic position of the state-led oil company which was 
short of cash due to the crisis (Bresnan 1999:98). However, the price increase was reversed on the 
17th of May with the blessing of the IMF, due to serious violence and rioting in large parts of 
Indonesia. Suharto claimed that further implementation of the IMF reforms would cause a threat 
to the political and social stability in the country. Just prior to the rise in fuel and electricity 
prices, the government announced that it had met the first deadlines for the implementation 
agreed on in the third Letter Of Intent. They had removed the ban on palm oil export and replaced 
an export tax of 40%. The government claimed that it was more devoted to the IMF reforms than 
before. Suharto’s dilemma did not appear to be as evident as it had been in the earlier rescue 
packages. At this point Suharto was allowed to take domestic considerations with a continuing 
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subsidy of basic food necessities. As opposed to the earlier rescue packages, the government now 
openly claimed their adherence to the IMF reforms.64 
 
4.2 Love the rupiah. Reject the IMF! 
The above discussed dilemma of adhering to IMF reforms while at the same time taking domestic 
considerations can also be examined in relation to the issue of erosion of sovereignty. Recipient 
governments can often experience that the IMF overrides the interests of the national government 
and that the prescribed reforms contradict what is viewed as proper economic policies in the 
recipient country. The IMF reforms introduced to Indonesia and South Korea in 1997-98 were 
wide in scope, and rather than focusing on the macroeconomics required for restoring market 
confidence, the aim was a fundamental restructuring of the Indonesian and the South Korean 
economies favouring liberalisation and the workings of the free market.65 In this second part of 
this chapter I will focus on the resistance from the Indonesian political elite towards IMF 
prescriptions. This includes objections to the Fund’s economic ideology that is based on the value 
of free market forces and a liberalisation of the economy.  
 
In Indonesia one could identify strong resentment against the IMF reforms among the political 
elite. The policies of the reforms were seen by many as ‘western’ principles that were not in tune 
with the Indonesian national economic ideology. Suharto also claimed that there was a conflict 
between the ‘liberal’ economic principles of the IMF reforms and Article 33 of the Indonesian 
constitution, which assigns the state and cooperatives a significant role in developing the 
Indonesian economy (Liddle 1999:25). Suharto’s youngest son Hutomo followed his father’s 
rhetoric and claimed, “I believe this is a part of the new colonialism” comparing the demands of 
the IMF and those of Indonesia’s former colonial masters, the Dutch and the Japanese (New York 
Times 1998b). The IMF was especially seen as acting on the behalf of powerful American 
                                                 
64 Since I have chosen to limit my thesis to the implementations of the IMF reforms until the 21th of May when Suharto 
stepped down from his presidency, I will not be discussing further reform implementation and agreements between the 
IMF and the Indonesian government. However, following what I have said here about the third rescue package, it could 
seem like the future reform process would be successful. This has not been the case. In the time of writing this, 
February 2002, Indonesia has still not completed the implementation of the required IMF reforms, nor has the economy 
recovered to a desired level.  
65 Hill (2000) among others argues that the IMF should rather have been concerned with core problems 
concerning the financial and foreign exchange collapse in order to get the market working again. He argues 
that it was not relevant for international investors if Indonesian leaders were corrupt with serious personal 
interest in the national economy. The investors had happily invested money in Indonesia prior to the crisis, 
and would continue to do so just as long as there were favourable economic conditions that could give them 
profit.  
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interests, using the reforms to contest the policies and power-base of the political elites in the 
Asian region. Higgott (2000:255) argues that the Asian crisis was not just an economic crisis, it 
also has to be seen as an ‘idea battle’ between the Asian and the Anglo-Saxon way of organising 
capitalist production. The long-standing criticism of statism inherent in the neo-classical 
literature, as well as the economic ideology of the IMF and western countries, is seen to be 
vindicated by the Asian crisis. The IMF was considered by many observers to be the principal 
instrument in eliminating the Asian model with its emphasis on state intervention, and rather 
imposing an open, liberalised economic order with few restrictions on foreign capital (Beeson 
1999, Robison & Rosser 1998).  
 
As negotiations between the IMF and Indonesia proceeded, it was clear that the Fund only would 
assist Indonesia if they agreed to implement neo-liberal reforms. Recovery of the Indonesian 
economy was linked to Western markets and their perceptions of the Indonesian political 
economy (Kivimäki 2000). This can become a problem when the recipient country’s government 
perceives the IMF reforms as harming the economy and not being in tune with the national 
economic ideology of this particular country. This proved to be important in the Indonesian case. 
Suharto seemed to disagree with the IMF in its understanding of Indonesia’s economic crisis. He 
was continuously blaming international investors saying that they had ruined the Indonesian 
economy through their financial speculations. The heavy stress from the IMF on structural 
reforms must be seen in relation to the powerful position of the USA in the IMF. The USA staged 
an ultimatum for further funding to the IMF that the structure of the political economy in 
Indonesia had to be addressed in the reforms (ibid.). Indonesia had earlier experienced both 
economic and political support from the USA, because of her role as an important ally in the 
battle against the communists in the Asian region (Anderson 1998).66 Because of the new global 
power structure that followed after the end of the cold war, the relationship between Indonesia 
and the USA had changed. The removal of the cold war context created a setting where the 
importance of Indonesia as a strategic partner for the USA was reduced, and this weakened 
Indonesia’s bargaining power towards the IMF and the USA during the Asian economic crisis.   
 
                                                 
66 The USA, together with Japan and the leading western European countries, were active in the Intergovernmental 
Group for Indonesia, a consortium that provided a vast and steady infusion to Indonesia’s development budget until the 
1990s. Anderson (1998) claims that in return for the economic support, a secret agreement was made between the USA 
and Indonesia, permitting American nuclear submarines to pass through Indonesian waters without surfacing for the 
tracking eyes of the Soviet satellites.  
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4.3 Suharto challenges the IMF 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, a common perception among governments that receive 
structural adjustment programs is that an implementation of the required reforms represents a 
subordination of national policies to external forces. With this in mind it is natural to discuss what 
are the means at hand for a government when it tries to show its sovereignty in the negotiating 
process? In this third part of Chapter 4 I will show how this perception took the form in Indonesia 
of a president challenging the IMF, demonstrating that he was not willing to let the IMF dictate 
the entire restructuring process. As said earlier in relation to reform implementation, the recipient 
government can be seen as an agent for western interests and ideology if it chooses to implement 
the prescribed reforms. Furthermore, I will discuss how Suharto challenged the authority of the 
IMF by showing that he was not a ‘tool for foreign interests’. Kahler (1993) argues that the 
appearance of subordination to IMF directives may lower a government’s legitimacy, and the 
following three incidents concerning the Indonesian experience are explored with this argument 
in mind. 
 
First, when Suharto announced in March 1998 that B. J. Habibie was to become his vice 
president, the value of rupiah fell drastically. The main reason was the international market’s 
dissatisfaction with Habibie’s nationalist economic ideology favouring state intervention. The 
kind of economic policies that Habibie represented were just what the IMF wanted to fight 
through their reforms. Suharto’s appointment of Habibie as vice president was interpreted as an 
indication of his willingness to fight the liberal economic ideology of the IMF and embrace the 
economic ideology that Habibie represented. It was also no secret that the IMF and the USA did 
not want Habibie to become vice president just on these grounds (Sharma 2001). The 
announcement of Habibie as vice president also increased the impression that Suharto sought to 
protect his family’s business interests. It was well known that the president’s family and Habibie 
shared interests in various private enterprises.  
 
Second, as I have said earlier, Suharto’s idea to establish a currency board was interpreted by 
many international observers as an attempt to stabilise the rupiah without making structural 
changes in the Indonesian economy. The currency board controversy also showed a power 
struggle between the IMF and Suharto, where a lot of prestige was involved for the IMF in 
making the Indonesian government accept their policy prescriptions. If Suharto had gone through 
with his currency board proposal and stabilised the rupiah, the credibility of IMF policies would 
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have been badly weakened.67 Obviously this was something that the IMF sought to prevent. 
Accordingly it was important that they made Suharto adhere to their interpretation of what the 
proper macroeconomic policies would be.  
 
Third, as Suharto announced his new government after his re-election as president in March 1998, 
he attracted negative attention because of the following controversial cabinet appointments. The 
power and importance of the Suharto family dynasty became even clearer with the appointment 
of the president's first daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, to the position of Minister for Social 
Affairs. The appointment of the new Minister of Industry and Trade, Bob Hasan, was also 
controversial because he was one of the president's closest business associates and one of the 
richest men in Indonesia with great personal interests in the Indonesian economy. Bob Hasan also 
owned many of the cartels and the monopolies that the IMF sought to abolish. When Suharto 
announced the new cabinet the declining influence of the economic technocrats that agreed with 
the IMF was also apparent as they were removed from their positions as Minster of Finance and 
the Co-ordinating Minister for Economy and Development. The new Minister of Finance was 
Fuad Bawaizer, a former tax official known as a business associate of Suharto’s children. These 
controversial cabinet appointments were by many interpreted as a last attempt from Suharto to 
show the Indonesian population and the international community that he was willing to fight the 
IMF, and that the interests of the nation came first (McLeod 1999, Bresnan 2000). The camp 
hostile to the IMF especially interpreted the appointment of Bob Hasan, Suharto’s close friend 
and business associate, positively. Hasan was seen as ‘a fixer’ and ‘the only person who can push 
things through’, implying that Hasan was a good nationalist that would prevent the IMF from 
‘taking over’ Indonesia. (FEER 1998b) These actions by the Indonesian president can be seen as 
a strategy for preventing an image of the Indonesian government as being subordinated to IMF 
directives. As the economic crisis erupted in Indonesia, Suharto’s bargaining power towards the 
IMF declined. The announcement of Habibie as vice minister, the currency board plans and the 
cabinet appointments in 1998 enhanced the picture that Suharto was willing to fight the IMF, or 
at least that he was not entirely enthusiastic to be dictated by an external actor with regard to 
national politics and economy.  
                                                 
67 However, the IMF argued that they were not against a currency board per se, because such arrangements had been 
successfully adopted in a number of IMF stabilization efforts prior to the Asian crisis (IMF 1999b). But in the case of 
Indonesia, IMF argued that it was important to implement the required economic reforms before establishing a 
currency board. This was based on the following economic reasoning; that a currency board arrangement can only 
work effectively if the banking system has the capacity to tolerate significant movements in domestic 
interest rates. Without this capacity, a currency board arrangement will induce a conversion of deposits into 
foreign exchange, further shrink the monetary base and greatly increase interest rates (Sharma 2001:102).  
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4.4 The South Korean experience  
As discussed so far in this chapter, the relationship between the IMF and the Indonesian 
government did not seem trouble-free when it came to the implementation of the IMF reforms. In 
this fourth section of this chapter I will analyze the South Korean experience in relation to the 
context where the interaction between the IMF and the South Korean government took place. As 
the IMF saw the Asian crisis, the cure to South Korea’s economic problems was to ditch the 
defunct state-directed economic system of the developmental state and instead create 'true' market 
economy, with an emphasis on liberalization of finance, international trade and the labour market 
(Chang 1998a). How did the South Korean government handle these requirements? The 
important feature of the relationship between South Korea and the IMF was the agreement 
between the two parties on which reforms were appropriate to restore the South Korean economy. 
President Kim Dae Jung was backed by the IMF and used the crisis to attack the Chaebols and to 
push through financial and corporate restructuring. In the first section of this fourth part of 
Chapter 4 I will give a brief overview of the IMF reforms in South Korea, and show which 
dilemma Kim Dae Jung was facing in relation to implementing IMF reforms when they 
contradicted with national interests. In the last part of this section I will see whether the national 
opposition in South Korea against the IMF reforms and the Fund’s economic ideology can be 
compared to the Indonesian case.  
 
4.4.1 The IMF reforms in South Korea 
The first agreement between the IMF and the South Korean government was signed in December 
1997, and addressed mainly two economic matters (Tatsuno 2000). First, fiscal matters were 
important to ease the burden of capital flight on the private sector. Second, structural reforms 
were required to stop capital outflows, and to restore foreign investors’ confidence. The 
government also agreed on a major restructuring of the Chaebols, as well as current and capital 
account liberalization.  
 
In the initial agreement between the IMF and South Korea, the growth rate was stipulated to 2.5% 
in 1998 (IMF 1997). Fiscal policies was ascribed a rather modest role in these programmes at the 
time, because the need for external current account adjustment was seen as relatively small. The 
budget surplus was to be about 2 % of the GDP to make room for the costs of restructuring the 
financial industry. The fiscal measures required to accomplish this included a widening of the 
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bases for corporate, income and value added taxes, along with reductions in government 
expenditure. Regarding monetary policy the IMF agreement reached its main objective, namely to 
curb the depreciation-inflation spiral. However, this also brought by a serious economic recession 
with a high rate of unemployment.  
 
Financial restructuring was the most important task that the IMF set up for South Korea in its 
reform agenda, and two issues were important (Shin &Ha 1999:71). First, the weakness in the 
balance sheets of financial institutions had to be addressed. Second, the financial system had to be 
restructured to minimize the likelihood of recurrence through introducing clear and firm exit 
policies for financial institutions, strong market and supervisory discipline, along with 
independence of the Central Bank. The structural adjustment plans also included reforms aimed at 
establishing efficient and transparent ties among the government, banks and businesses in order to 
upgrade their accounting, auditing, and disclosure standards. This required corporate financial 
statements to be publicized on a consolidated basis and they had to be certified by external 
auditors. Trade would be liberalized in line with WTO standards, with the elimination of trade-
related subsidies. The capital account was to be liberalized through opening up the national 
money, bond and equity markets to capital inflows, as well as liberalizing restrictions on FDIs. 
Labour market reforms were also demanded to facilitate the re-employment of labour.  
 
4.4.2 Kim Dae Jung’s dilemma: I M F(ired)!  
Although the wide scope of the required reforms, the one attracting most attention was the one 
aiming at increasing the ’flexibility of the workforce’; meaning eliminating regulations that 
protected employment (Kim 2000). During, and prior to the crisis, international investors argued 
that it was not profitable for them to invest in South Korean companies if they could not lay off 
workers in order to restructure their firms when this was necessary. This was a sensitive issue, 
because there had already been some laxation on restrictions concerning layoffs in a reform 
issued in March 1998.68 President Kim’s dilemma in relation to the implementation of the labour 
reforms, was how to attract foreign investments, while at the same time securing labour rights for 
South Korean workers (Haggard 2000:211). Labour Unions had supported Kim Dae Jung during 
the presidential election in 1997, and the IMF reforms concerning labour regulations was of 
course not well received within these groups. Kim Dae Jung’s solution was to establish a tripartite 
                                                 
68 But due to strong labour opposition against these reforms, the government put a two-year hold on the 
implementation. 
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committee where the two largest labour unions were represented together with representatives 
from the Chaebols and the government. After months of negotiations, the committee faced a 
historic agreement where the labour unions accepted new labour laws implying more permissive 
rules on layoffs and the employment of temporary workers. In return for the labour unions’ 
cooperation, the government committed itself to introduce unemployment benefits, like public 
work programmes, subsidies to unemployed workers and an extensive social net, as well as 
allowing freedom for union organization and the right to establish political parties.  
 
Implicit in Kim Dae Jung’s dilemma was the problem of dealing with the social implications of 
the required labour reforms (Chang 1998a). This meant that the earlier arrangements of the 
workforce as ‘belonging’ to a Chaebol had to be changed. To the South Koreans their workplace 
plays a very important role, because the corporation they work for often also supplies housing, 
hospitals and education. A restructuring of the Chaebols implied that the current system of ‘quasi-
lifetime’ employment had to be abandoned. This would require great changes in the South 
Korean attitudes and institutions regarding job security, taxation, corporate recruitment and pay 
structure and industrial training. However, as a way of handling and prepare such changes, Kim 
Dae Jung allowed the labour unions to participate in the tripartite committee to reach a kind of 
consensus between the involved parties concerning the further restructuring (Shin & Ha 1999:93).   
 
4.4.3 Implementation of IMF reforms vs. national considerations  
During the spring of 1998 the South Korean economy seemed to recover from the crisis. The won 
appreciated gradually to the USD, and led the South Korean monetary authorities to further 
decrease interest rates. The South Korean government successfully issued a global sovereign 
bond, with a significant amount of capital flowing into the domestic financial market, and the 
foreign reserves available exceeded outstanding short-term debt.  The structural reform agenda, 
financial restructuring, capital account and trade liberalization were further accelerated. This 
positive development of the national economy quieted some of the protests against the IMF 
reforms in South Korea. In the western world, Kim Dae Jung was considered as ‘The IMF man in 
Seoul’ and there were few open disputes between president Kim Dae Jung and the IMF over 
economic policies (Bello et.al. 1998b:2). The main difference between Indonesia and South 
Korea in relation to the context where the reform implementation took place was that in South 
Korea, the IMF and Kim Dae Jung shared the same vision of how to best restructure the 
economy, while in Indonesia Suharto strongly opposed the reforms suggested by the IMF. 
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Compared to Indonesia, the democratic election of president Kim Dae Jung in 1997 also 
strengthened his position in terms of the people supporting his reform agenda, even though one of 
his slogans prior to his election was that it was necessary to renegotiate the IMF agreement. Kim 
Dae Jung also differed from Suharto with respect to private economic interests in the national 
economy. Kim Dae Jung relied on the support of medium and small enterprises and was seen as 
‘their man’ in breaking up the tight relationship between the Chaebols and the state. This did not 
prove to be an obstacle in the reform implementation, rather the opposite, as reducing the 
powerful role of the Chaebols was at the top of the IMF’s agenda.  Suharto on the other hand 
sought to protect the strong position of the powerful private enterprises, especially those that 
belonged to his close family and business associates.  
 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
How did conflict and cooperation between the IMF and the recipient government concerning the 
properness of economic reforms manifest itself in the implementation process? In this chapter I 
have explored two quite different cases in relation to this question. In Indonesia president Suharto 
seemed to disagree with the IMF both about the cause of the crisis as well as the prescribed 
reforms. South Korea proves a different experience because president Kim Dae Jung and the IMF 
had similar understandings of the causes of the South Korean crisis and of how to best restructure 
the national economy. It was also important that president Kim was an ‘outsider’ and elected as 
president with promises of economic reforms that mainly targeted the close relationship between 
the state and Chaebols.   
 
In this chapter I have discussed how both Indonesia and South Korea faced a dilemma in dealing 
with IMF requirements when these contradicted with national considerations. Suharto 
experienced this dilemma in two areas. First in relation to his own family’s interest in the 
Indonesian national economy, where the implementation of the IMF reforms would harm his 
personal economic interests. Second, that the implementation of some of the reforms, like the 
abolition of the subsidies on fuel and food, would have serious consequences for the population, 
and especially the poor. When faced with these dilemmas Suharto chose to give priority to 
national and family interests over the implementation of IMF reforms. In South Korea, Kim Dae 
Jung experienced a dilemma concerning how to deal with the IMF reforms that aimed at 
increasing ‘flexibility in the workforce’. However, Kim Dae Jung negotiated with labour unions 
and managed to make a deal with them making it easier to lay off workers. In return for their 
cooperation the president promised the labour unions concessions in forms of unemployment 
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benefits, freedom for union organization and the right for labour unions to establish political 
parties. South Korea’s strength in comparison with Indonesia concerning the reform 
implementation was that Kim Dae Jung managed to mobilise groups that shared his views on how 
the economic development in South Korea ought to be. This made the South Korean state more 
autonomous than the Indonesian, in the meaning that Kim Dae Jung’s support-base and his 
legitimacy gave him better room for manoeuvre than Suharto experienced.  
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CHAPTER 5 STATE CAPACITY  
In the previous chapter I discussed the implementation process with regard to the context where 
the interplay between the IMF and the Indonesian and the South Korean governments took place. 
In the present and in the next chapter, I will be discussing how national political factors 
influenced the governments’  implementation of IMF reforms in Indonesia and South Korea. The 
Asian states were known for their successful implementation of economic policies prior to the 
Asian crisis, often explained in terms of an effective bureaucracy and a close relationship 
between the government and the business sector. The theoretical perspective of state capacity 
has been influenced by analyses of the impressive economic development in East Asia during the 
1970s, and the focus is on the technical and administrative capacity of states to successfully 
formulate and implement economic reforms. Following the literature about the Asian 
developmental states, an important argument is that a well functional bureaucracy along 
Weberian lines is a significant feature of high state capacity to implement reforms (Evans 1995, 
Weiss 1998). In addition to a ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy, the state should also have the 
administrative and technical capacity to direct the business sector towards national economic 
goals.  
 
Drawing on theories concerned with state capacity the aim of this chapter is to explore how (i) 
bureaucratic organisation and (ii) features associated with the relationship between the 
government and business sector influenced the Indonesian and South Korean implementation of 
IMF reforms in 1997-1998. This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part I will examine 
the role that the bureaucracy in Indonesia played in policymaking and in the implementation of 
economic reforms prior to, and during the Asian economic crisis. My guiding question in this first 
part of this chapter is: How did bureaucratic conditions influence the reform implementation in 
Indonesia? In the second part of this chapter I will discuss the ability of governments and the 
state apparatus to guide the business sector towards national goals in order to successfully 
implement policies. The guiding question when dealing with this issue is: How did features 
associated with the relationship between the Indonesian government and the business sector 
hinder, or promote the Indonesian government in implementing reforms? In the third part of this 
chapter I will discuss how the concept of state capacity can be used to explore the South Korean 
experience concerning the two issues, bureaucratic organization and features associated with the 
relationship between the state and the business sector as far as the implementation of IMF 
 60
reforms in 1997-98 is concerned. In the final section I will sum up the arguments made in this 
chapter and discuss how they relate to the two questions proposed above.  
 
5.1 Bureaucratic organization in Indonesia 
The role of the Indonesian bureaucrats in managing the crisis has not attracted much attention in 
discussions about the Asian economic crisis, even though the bureaucracy is usually seen as an 
important part of the state apparatus when economic policies are developed and sought 
implemented. The literature concerning state capacity argue that a high degree of administrative 
and technical capacity to implement reforms is much due to a bureaucracy working along 
Weberian lines. In this first part of Chapter 5 I will look closer at the role of the bureaucracy in 
Indonesia and explore how it can be said to relate to ‘Weberian’ features, like insulation from 
particularistic interests and with a meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders. I will 
discuss how the Indonesian bureaucracy can be said to be divided between the technocrats 
favouring economic liberalisation (later referred to as the economists) and technocrats favouring 
state intervention in the economy (a group that I will refer to as the nationalists). The aim of the 
first part of this chapter is to explore whether the Indonesian bureaucracy can be said to have low 
or high state capacity in reform implementation.  
 
5.1.1 The makers of policy 
The part of the Indonesian bureaucracy that deals with economic policymaking and 
implementation is often described as lacking bureaucratic autonomy, because of two substantial 
groups that have been competing for influence; the economists who favoured economic 
liberalisation, and the nationalists, favouring state intervention in the economy (Hill 1996, 
Schwarz 1994).  The economists have traditionally lacked any solid domestic power-base, but 
they have been important in securing economic aid from western financial institutions as well as 
for maintaining international investor confidence through their adherence to ‘western’ economic 
ideology, stressing the importance of free market forces and the limited role of the state. The 
nationalists on the other hand have been committed to the idea that an interventionist state was 
needed in order to catch up with the industrialised countries. It was also important for them that 
the government should help indigenous Indonesian businessmen to challenge the powerful 
position of their Chinese-Indonesian counterparts. The nationalists have traditionally had its 
power-base in the Ministry of Industry, the Investment Board, the Ministry of Research and 
Technology, as well as in important state-owned enterprises such as the oil company Pertamina. 
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The economists have traditionally been employed in the Ministry of Finance and in the Central 
Bank (MacIntyre 1993:157).  
 
When Suharto officially came to power in 1966 he gave the ‘Berkley mafia’, a group of 
American trained economists, the task of reforming the economy. In the beginning of the New 
Order, the economists experienced substantial power in directing economic policies, and within a 
few years they had stabilized the economy with the assistance from international donors. Suharto 
gave the economists enough leeway to open up the financial sector, lower import tariffs,  to 
remove some non-tariff barriers and to take other steps to improve Indonesia’s investment 
climate. In addition, the economists controlled the Bappenas, the Indonesian national planning 
board, as well as the finance and the monetary portfolios. However, during the 1970s two 
instances undermined the influence of the economists, and gave rise to the influence of the 
nationalists. First, rising oil prices in 1973 led to a sharp increase in the income available to the 
Indonesian state. The oil wealth was used to subsidise new industries like steel, cement, 
chemicals, fertilisers, aluminium and machine tools. Second, riots in 1974 had showed a large 
degree of dissatisfaction from the public towards the rising economic influence of international 
investors and Chinese-Indonesian businessmen. The availability of oil money now provided the 
opportunity for the nationalists to introduce a variety of programmes that advanced Pribumi’s 
(native Indonesians) businesses, from preferential awarding of contracts to bank lending.   
 
As the economists’ influence had declined with the increased access to oil money, their influence 
started to rise again as oil prices dropped in 1982. In order to recover from the decline in oil 
prices, wide-ranging liberalisation reforms were introduced in the 1980s and import-substituting 
industrialisation was gradually transformed into an export-oriented pattern of development, while 
international investors were again welcomed. During the liberalisation of the Indonesian economy 
in the 1980s, Pinkus & Ramli (1998) argue that the economic bureaucrats’ efforts to liberalize 
was not just driven by their ideological conviction, but also because it turned out to be a way to 
limit the growing power of the political and business elite. The problem with the Indonesian 
economy as the economists saw it, was that the preferential lending system provided by the state-
owned banks often went to political elites, especially Suharto’s family, with no guarantee for 
profits. The result was a large increase in non-performing loans. In order to introduce more 
competition in the financial sector, financial reforms in 1983 and 1988 turned Indonesia into one 
of the world’s most liberalized financial systems, with minimal state regulations on new banking 
establishments, interest rates or reserve requirements. The privatisation of the financial sector led 
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to a large increase in lending activity, with an annual increase of 40% from 1988 to 1996 (ibid: 
725). The result of the liberal reforms was a financial sector made up of a large number of small 
banks with risky lending procedures and with lacking regulations on financial sector activities, 
like non-existent bankruptcy laws. The effort of the economists to deregulate the financial sector 
in order to reduce the preferential lending of the state banks towards the political elite, had rather 
turned into a situation where the political elite enjoyed privileges from an under-regulated 
financial sector.   
 
When the economy started to grow again in the early 1990s the influence of the bureaucrats 
belonging to the nationalist camp again increased. A sign of the declining influence of the 
economists was that Suharto transferred the control over SOEs and banks from economist 
controlled ministries to the state secretariat and the Minister for Research and Technology 
B.J.Habibie, who was known for his close business connections with the Suharto family and for 
favouring state intervention in the economy (Soesastro 1999). Particularof the baSuharto’s re-
election as president in 1993, the relative influence of the nationalist camp was clear. When 
Suharto introduced his new government in 1993 it was the first time that an economist did not 
hold the position of Co-ordinating Minister of Economics and Development (Haggard 2000:44). 
Another example of the economists’ diminished influence was the neglects from the political elite 
concerning the Central Bank’s introduction of stronger legal lending limits in 1993. Even though 
the Central Bank governor threatened to take legal action against those banks that broke the 
limits, nothing ever eventuated (Schwarz 1994:77). During the mid 1990s, the economists still 
made efforts to further liberalize the economy through launching reforms that sought to dismantle 
the protection of steel, automotive and agriculture sectors. They also sought to control foreign 
borrowings to stem up the growth of Indonesia’s foreign debt.69  
 
5.1.2 How did bureaucratic conditions influence the implementation  
of IMF reforms in Indonesia in 1997-98? 
From the above one can see that even though the bureaucracy has been divided, it has played an 
important part in developing and directing the economy and successfully implemented economic 
                                                 
69 However, the entire board that was set up to manage this task was replaced when they protested over a decision that 
allowed a petrochemical project, Chandra Astri (where a number of Suharto’s business partners were involved) massive 
borrowing abroad. Finally in 1997 the team’s authority was reduced when the government eliminated the ceiling on 
private borrowings (Robison & Rosser 1998).  
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reforms prior to the Asian crisis. So how did the bureaucracy influence the implementation of 
IMF reforms during the Asian crisis? In the initial stages of the crisis, and prior to the assistance 
of the IMF, the economists in the bureaucracy, in an attempt to restore the balance of payment, 
introduced fiscal and monetary measures to cope with the sliding exchange rate. They also 
cancelled numerous large government and private infrastructure projects belonging to Suharto’s 
family. Soesastro (1999) argues that in the beginning the crisis was seen as a major opportunity 
by the economists within the bureaucracy to address the structural problems in the Indonesian 
economy and to continue the deregulation process that in their eyes had been delayed during the 
last decade. The IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) backed the 
economists, but due to their weak position during the 1990s they lacked any real domestic power-
base and relied on the IMF to keep them in positions of influence (Hill 2000).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, three factors are important for successful reform implementation in 
relation to bureaucratic organisation. First, that the bureaucracy is autonomous, meaning isolated 
from particularistic interests. Second that the bureaucracy has Weberian characteristics like 
meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders, and third that trans-national alliances 
between the recipient government and the IMF should be established.  Neither of these premises 
was apparent in the Indonesian case, and I will below explore each of the three characteristics in 
relation to the Indonesian experience. First, the Indonesian bureaucracy is not known for being 
autonomous. It is rather described as having clientelistic characteristics, where corruption has 
been an important feature. There have been many instances where bureaucrats have helped 
favoured businessmen, for example by providing them with credit from state banks (Schwarz 
1994:133).70 According to the Weberian ideal bureaucracy there should be a separation between 
the politicians and the bureaucracy. The aim is that difficult and contentious policy problems can 
be solved by removing them from the hands of politicians, insulating them from group pressures 
and assigning them to knowledgeable and well-socialised technocrats. To a certain degree this 
was the case in Indonesia. The workings of the bureaucracy have been isolated from collective 
group pressures in general, although with a serious exception of the pressures from the small, but 
very powerful political and business elites close to the president and his family. However, the 
                                                 
70 A case that attracted much attention in relation to this was the Eddie Tanzill case. A state-owned bank, Bank 
Bapindo, gave a huge credit equal 430 millions USD to politically connected businessman Eddie Tanzill for a textile 
enterprise, Kanindo. The project turned out to be grossly overfinanced and much of the money from the loan 
disappeared forcing Bank Bapindo to write off the credit as bad debt (Rachibibi 1999:33). Following queries and 
revelations, Tanzill was convicted of bribing officials at Bank Bapindo to obtain the loan. Tanzill was in the end jailed, 
but is thought to have bribed his way out of prion and his whereabouts remain unknown (Haggard 2000:26).  
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important point is that the ‘difficult and contentious’ policy problems are removed from the hands 
of the politicians as long as the president is guaranteed that the outcome is in line with his wishes. 
The case of Indonesia shows that during the Asian crisis, those bureaucrats that opposed the 
president’s actions and favoured IMF reforms were easily ignored. One example is the dismissal 
of the Central Bank governor, Soesdrdjad Djiwandono, because of his opposition to the currency 
board idea. The dismissal of the governor was not against the law, but it was highly controversial, 
especially in times when the international community was watching Suharto’s moves.71 Earlier, in 
December 1997, Suharto had also dismissed four out of seven managing directors in the Central 
Bank, and replaced them with officials of his own choosing without consulting the governor first. 
By mid April 1998 all the senior management in the Central Bank had been changed, and among 
the new managing directors, barely half had former experience from the Central Bank (Sharma 
2001:101). Suharto also fired the head of IBRA around the same time as he dismissed he Central 
Bank governor. Sharma (ibid.) argues that a part of the problem of the perception that IBRA was 
just a ‘paper tiger’, was a result of Suharto undermining their efforts through not publicizing the 
operations of IBRA. This gave him more legitimacy in dismissing the head of IBRA as opposed 
to a situation where the workings and operations of IBRA were better known. This example 
shows that the president had great power in deciding who would inhabit the various positions in 
the bureaucracy as well as controlling economic policies himself. In this way he also showed that 
he was not interested in leaving the responsibility of difficult and contentious policy problems 
into the hands of the bureaucracy alone.  
 
Second, the Indonesian bureaucracy does neither have the characteristics of a Weberian 
bureaucracy in that it is an elite service that succeeds in attracting highly trained and motivated 
graduates (MacIntyre 1994:261). In Indonesia there is a genuine shortage of well-educated 
bureaucrats. About one fourth of those who have a college or university degree do never attain a 
rank corresponding to their educational level, and an average of about 40% of civil servants have 
an individual grade below the grade required for the position that they hold (King 1998). The 
correspondence between a civil servant’s formal education and his agency of employment also 
varies (ibid). This may imply that the technical capacity of the bureaucrats that is necessary to 
have high state capacity in reform implementation, may not have been at the desired level. 
However, this does not necessarily explain why the implementation of the IMF reforms in 1997-
                                                 
71 Since 1983 the Governor of Bank Indonesia holds the status as a cabinet member and thereby it is legal to dismiss 
the governor as a cabinet member. However, the law stipulates that the president can only dismiss the governor before 
the end of a five year term, in the following circumstances: at the personal wish of the governor, on the governor's 
death, or when for some reason the governor cannot serve in office (Article 17 of Law No 13, 1968, on Central 
banking).  
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98 failed, because the Indonesian bureaucracy had experienced successful implementations of 
economic reforms prior to the Asian crisis. The characteristics of the bureaucracy have not 
changed dramatically since then.  
 
A third factor that is important when discussing the influence of the Indonesian bureaucrats on 
the implementation of IMF reforms, is once again to consider the context where the interplay 
between the IMF and the recipient governments take place. An important part of reform 
implementation literature focuses on the need for IMF to make alliances with domestic groups 
that can support their reforms. The IMF can engage in strategies that attempt to shape the 
incentives of their domestic counterparts by influencing the domestic political level that 
surrounds the implementation in various ways. According to Kahler (1993) it is crucial for the 
IMF to develop a trans-national alliance between IMF staff and domestic political actors in order 
to successfully implement the reforms. Potential alliance partners are found in government 
ministries that share IMF’s policy preferences, like in the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank. In Indonesia this proved quite difficult. The IMF faced a difficult task in order to develop 
trans-national alliances, because the group that sympathised with their reform agenda, the 
economists, did not exercise much influence in Indonesian economy at the time of the crisis. The 
existing economic policy was more in line with the nationalists’ standing, favouring state 
intervention. Although there were sections within the bureaucracy that favoured the IMF reforms, 
Suharto still had the power and authority to remove people who disagreed with him, as seen in the 
earlier discussed dismissal of the Central Bank governor. 
 
5.2 The relationship between the government and the business sector in 
Indonesia 
An important feature of the Indonesian management of the Asian crisis was the opposition from 
powerful business interests towards the IMF reforms. According to structural adjustment 
literature, the opposite has rather been the situation in other cases (Haggard 1995). Traditionally 
the business sector is seen as favouring IMF reforms because it implies liberalisation of trade and 
cuts in taxes that benefit private enterprises. So why did the powerful business interests not 
oppose the implementation of IMF reforms in Indonesia? As pointed out earlier, an important part 
of a successful reform implementation in the Asian states prior to the Asian crisis was the ability 
of the state to discipline the business sector to work towards national economic goals, where the 
allocation of financial resources was an important means to achieve this. Within the tradition of 
state capacity it is not only the ability of the state to control the business sector that is important, 
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but for a successful reform implementation an ‘embedded’ relationship between the state and the 
business sector is necessary. Embeddedness is important in two respects: First, that 
institutionalised networks that link business and government are seen as positive because they 
increase the flow of information thus improving the quality of policymaking. Second, that some 
kind of connectedness between the state and the business sector is needed because the state relies 
on the private sector for implementation of their policies.   
 
In the second section of this chapter I will look closer at the Indonesian experience and discuss 
whether the relationship between the government and the business sector in Indonesia can be said 
to be ‘embedded’. I will argue that although the Indonesian business sector is closely related to 
the government, this relationship cannot be described as ‘embedded’ in Peter Evans’ (1995) 
terms.  The relationship between the government and the business sector in Indonesia is rather 
characterised by a business sector that is dependent on the government for access to privileges. 
The liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s further increased this dependency. I will discuss 
whether this feature of the relationship between the government and the business sector in 
Indonesia might explain why there was so little opposition from the business sector when Suharto 
showed unwillingness to implement the IMF reforms. More specific is the question that I seek to 
examine in this second section of this chapter: How did features associated with the relationship 
between the Indonesian government and the business sector hinder, or promote the Indonesian 
government in implementing IMF reforms? 
 
5.2.1 The business sector in Indonesia  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Indonesia has a long history of economic nationalism, where 
state intervention was seen by some as necessary in order to guide and manage industrial 
development.72 During the 1950s the state was giving out subsidies of different kinds and it was 
necessary for businessmen to have personal ties with the politicians and the bureaucrats to access 
these subsidies. It was especially important for the Chinese-Indonesians to gain these benefits as 
they sought protection and patronage of influential politicians in return for cash and shares or 
joint ventures. When president Sukarno introduced ‘Guided Democracy’ in 1957, he confiscated 
all Dutch assets and all Dutch firms were taken over by the state. The number of SOEs increased 
                                                 
72 One factor contributing to the favouring of state intervention can be the country’s long colonial experience where the 
new Indonesian national leaders saw capitalism as associated with colonialism and exploitation (MacIntyre 1994). 
Another important factor was that when Indonesia became independent from the Dutch in 1945, the local business 
community was made up of Chinese rather than indigenous Indonesians. Political leaders thought that it was necessary 
for the state to intervene in markets to secure the indigenous majority a satisfactory share of the economic benefits. 
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due to foreign borrowing and income from the oil industry. The banking system was also brought 
under control by the state and credit was being channelled to the expanding public sector. When 
Suharto officially took power in 1966, it was clear that the economic adventures of Sukarno had 
failed. So with the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank (among others), Suharto 
implemented a stabilisation program aimed at liberalising the economy. Spendings on SOEs were 
cut down, trade barriers lowered, investment laws were loosened up to attract foreign 
investments. However, as I showed in the first part of this chapter, the boom in oil prices in the 
1970s opened up for a new state-led industrial development, and gave the government an 
opportunity to invest in key industries. State intervention also emerged in the financial sector, 
where state-owned banks started to dominate the financial sector and lending activities were 
heavily influenced by government intervention.  
 
During the liberalisation process in the 1980s, private business enjoyed a spectacular growth, 
along with the rise of a new generation of young native Indonesian businessmen, many of whom 
were the children of high ranking military officers and especially the children of president 
Suharto. When Suharto's family entered the business arena, most major state companies were 
locked into joint ventures with the Suharto family’s private business conglomerates. These 
included the state-owned oil company Pertamina, its subsidiaries, public works construction 
companies, state-owned pharmaceutical companies, state-owned telecommunication and satellite 
communication companies (Schwarz 1994). The growth in number of conglomerates was very 
closely related to government support through the allocation of credit.  
 
As said earlier the Chinese-Indonesian businessmen had a privileged position in Indonesia. Given 
Indonesia’s volatile political history and periodic violence against the Chinese-Indonesians, they 
naturally had incentives to form political alliances that could offer protection, including with the 
military. At the same time their minority status and wealth made them highly reluctant to engage 
in any overt political activity, political relationships were more likely to be personal, clientelistic 
and non-transparent. Suharto and lower-level politician and military leaders had to balance 
lucrative relationships with private Chinese-Indonesian businesses, while at the same time having 
to respond to the wishes of native Indonesian businessmen.  
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5.2.2 The politics of liberalisation 
As I have argued earlier in Chapter 4, the reason for the lack of commitment from Suharto in 
implementing the IMF reforms must be seen in relation to his vested personal interests in the 
Indonesian economy. The IMF reforms targeted Suharto’s personal economic interests and the 
reforms required structural changes in the Indonesian economy. In this section I will discuss how 
the close relationship between the state and the business sector enabled Suharto to expand his 
private business empire in the 1980s. It was not a relationship characterised by ‘embeddedness’ 
and mutual dependence as can indicate high state capacity, it was rather a situation where the 
government’s members had strong personal interests in the national economy and where the 
business sector was dependent on the state for getting access to subsidies or lucrative deals.  
 
Following the oil-boom period of 1973-1982 and heavy state intervention, important state 
monopolies developed within sectors such as banking, television, electricity, toll road 
construction and telecommunication. As discussed earlier, the interventionist Indonesian state 
withdrew from many of its interventionist practices in the early 1980s. The main task was to 
liberalise the economy through reducing bank regulations, toning down the earlier preferential 
bank lending, liberalising and streamlining local and foreign investment laws, lower tariff 
barriers, and to abolish several import and public sector industry monopolies (MacIntyre 1994). 
Rapidly increasing and highly mobile capital flows meant that the old macro economic 
framework had to be adjusted to fit the new policies, but as shown earlier in this chapter the 
supervision of the financial liberalisation was not a prioritised task. Haggard (2000:32) argues 
that the economic liberalisation in the 1980s must be characterised as ‘captured liberalisation’ 
where the economic reforms were implemented without the adequate legal, administrative, or 
informational capacity to check private ineptitude, malfeasance or fraud. The liberalisation 
process represented an important shift in political and social power, and a powerful coalition 
emerged between private business interests and political and bureaucratic powerholders that 
gained from these reforms (Robison & Rosser 1998:1595). There was a shift of power away from 
state managers to private interests and from the harnessing of state authority to private agendas. 
In Indonesia the new business elite consisted of people from the bureaucracy and their families, 
and notably Suharto’s children. Instead of a free market after liberal economic principles, the rise 
of new business interests were linked to the opening of former public monopolies and the 
establishment of an open banking system and capital market. Clientilism and connections to the 
political elite were factors that determined business success rather than free competition in a 
functioning market.  
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An important part of the literature concerning state capacity stresses that the degree of capacity in 
reform implementation varies with the ability of the state to direct the business sector towards 
preferred sectors. The important means to achieve this, is through allocating credit on the basis of 
preferential lending programmes. The Indonesian state had intervened in the financial markets 
from the early days of the 1970s. However, MacIntyre (1993:151) argues that there are four 
factors that make it reasonable to assume that the allocation of finance has enhanced ‘captured 
liberalism’ and thus shown the lacking technical and administrative capacity of the government to 
direct business into desired sectors. First, Indonesia lacked the bureaucratic expertise to monitor 
and enforce the complex system of preferential credit.73 Second, the entire system of preferential 
credit opened up for malpractice and corruption where the patrimonial needs of the political 
leaders often took precedence over the official hierarchy of priority borrowers. Third, the 
transaction costs involved with small scale subsidized lending was very high, due to a high level 
of no repayment, and much of the credit earmarked for small borrowers went to large borrowers 
instead. Last, the effort to concentrate credit towards priority borrowers was weakened by the fact 
that Indonesia since 1971 had had an open capital account. When large domestic firms could not 
gain access to cheap credit in Indonesia, they went offshore to raise capital instead.  
 
Hamilton-Hart (2000:110) argues in relation to the liberalization process in the 1980s that 
prudential regulations and financial liberalization require different political conditions. The 
benefits of financial deregulation in the context of an open capital account are relatively 
concentrated, while the costs and risks are diffuse. Therefore, deregulatory reforms, at least in the 
financial sector, are politically easier than prudential regulations, particularly if circumstantial 
factors such as balance of payments crisis make status quo untenable.  In Indonesia the rapid 
growth in the deregulated private banking sector gave the business and political elite an 
opportunity to take advantage of the financial liberalisation and the preferential lending 
programmes. The argument about the Indonesian government's prudential failure brings up the 
question of political preconditions. Indonesia's governing institutions under Suharto can be seen 
as an example of a strong government accompanied by unrestrained extremes. The state-
dominated New Order ideology was a result of a manipulation of public policy in the interest of 
regime maintenance and private agendas of those with personal ties to the president. Suharto was 
                                                 
73 This could for example be seen in the role of the Central Bank in relation to preferential lending. There were 
elaborate lists of priority categories in the Central Bank, but not only had they little or no idea of the purpose of 
providing cheap loans, they also lacked the oversight and the ability to monitor whether subsidised loans ever reached 
the targets groups.   
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able to develop the governing institutions through an effective security apparatus so that they 
suited his interests as well as meeting the developmental goals needed for political stability. A 
personalized clientelistic bureaucratic system was compatible with his objectives. Indonesia 
becomes a case where the lack of an embedded relationship between the state and the private 
sector has developed into a situation where the strong state controls the business sector, not by 
disciplining business towards national goals, but rather to secure the political elites’ own personal 
economic interests.  
 
5.2.3 How did features associated with the relationship between the Indonesian 
government and the business sector hinder, or promote the government in 
implementing IMF reforms? 
The Indonesian experience shows an authoritarian state that has been able to minimize collective 
action by business groups, but it has not been able to insulate itself from particularist interests 
stemming from clientelistic connections. This was evident in the failure to implement IMF 
reforms that harmed the economic interests of Suharto’s family or their business associates. 
However, the Indonesian state can be said to have been clientelistic since the early 1950s, but still 
been successful in implementing reforms. The important point here, is that the policies 
implemented earlier did not threaten the economic interests of the political elites like the IMF 
reforms did in 1997-98. When the government was faced with the requirement to implement the 
IMF reforms that would change the structure of the Indonesian political economy, they chose not 
to do so. This reluctance to introduce reforms that might hurt personal economic interests had 
also happened earlier in the 1990s, as shown in section 5.1.1 in the case of Chandra Astri and the 
disregard of the Central Bank’s introduction of stronger legal lending limits in 1993. 
 
The Indonesian liberalisation process in the 1980s had been an opportunity for Suharto and his 
business associates to engage in new business activities where access to preferential credit, 
lucrative state monopolies or subsidies almost guaranteed economic success. This feature of the 
government and business sector relations is important in understanding the failure to implement 
IMF reforms in Indonesia. As long as the president and the government had serious personal 
economic interests in the Indonesian economy, along with the authority to control the business 
sector, the reforms that sought to break up this relationship were not implemented.  
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5.3 The South Korean experience 
In the third section of this chapter I will explore how the IMF reform implementation in South 
Korea can be said to be more successful than the Indonesian through discussing the technical and 
administrative capacity of the bureaucracy and features associated with the relationship between 
the state and the business sector. In the first part of this section I will show that the South Korean 
bureaucracy played an important role in the reform implementation process during the Asian 
crisis in two respects. First, through the special committees that Kim Dae Jung set up to manage 
the implementation of the IMF reforms. Second, that an increasing part of the bureaucrats 
supported Dae Jung’s reform agenda. Features associated with the relationship between the 
government and the business sector before and during the implementation process in 1997-98, is 
interesting for two reasons: First, the South Korean economy was liberalised in the 1990s with an 
aim of breaking up the tight relationship between the Chaebols and the government. The required 
IMF reforms fitted well into this restructuring process. Second, the fact that Kim Dae Jung was 
not dependent upon the support of the Chaebols for his presidency, put him in a position where he 
did not have to give any concessions to the Chaebols  when it came to implementing the IMF 
reforms.  
 
5.3.1 The decline of the developmental state 
As shown earlier in the case of Indonesia, one also witnessed in South Korea a turn towards a 
more liberal economic approach in the mid 1980s, and many argue that this marked an important 
shift away from the developmental state model.74 A number of private banks were privatised and 
the financial market was partially liberalised. The capacity of the state to coordinate investment 
though the control over credit was weakened because of changes in the financial sector that led to 
large inflows of portfolio investment along the privatisation of state banks (Weiss 2000:31). With 
the introduction of the ‘Industrial Development Law’ in 1986, the industrial policy shifted from 
selected sectors towards more functional or market-oriented sectors. 
 
Another important feature of the developmental state model had been the importance of a pilot 
agency within the bureaucracy that oversaw the national economic development. In the early 
1990s the EPB in South Korea was increasingly marginalised and finally abolished in 1993 (but 
later absorbed into the Ministry of Finance and Economy), because of continuing disagreements 
                                                 
74 The liberalisation process in the 1980s has to be seen in relation to South Korea’s prospect of becoming a OECD 
member, where USA demanded that the South Korean government had to open the capital market in order to gain 
membership, which they finally did in 1996.  
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concerning the government’s wish for capital market opening. To many this was interpreted as 
the final sign that the South Korean state could no longer be considered a developmental state.  
 
5.3.2 The role of the bureaucracy in the implementation process 
An important aspect of the implementation of the IMF reforms in South Korea in 1997-98 was 
the way the president enhanced his power over the state apparatus, in order to limit the opposition 
within the bureaucracy towards the reforms. Kim Dae Jung formally reorganised the government 
so as to create the Budget and Planning Bureau, which he made directly subordinate to the 
president. He also established the Financial Supervisory Board, which he placed outside of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy. The president used these two agencies rather than the MOFE 
as key agents of reform in order to avoid opposition from bureaucrats that did not share his view 
on which reforms were necessary for recovery. To secure the implementation of the IMF reforms, 
Kim Dae Jung filled every key position in the Budget and Planning Bureau and the Financial 
Supervisory Board with officials either from his home region or with bureaucrats who were 
sympathetic to his reform programme (Mo & Moon 1999). Because of this, speculations were 
that Kim Dae Jung wished to weaken the influence of the bureaucrats that were known to have 
strong relations to the Chaebols or sympathies to the past regime. So why was it that necessary 
for Dae Jung to control the bureaucracy? An important reason was that changes in the economic 
ideological preferences of the bureaucrats during the 1980s had led to a conflict within the earlier 
autonomous bureaucracy over the role and scope of the state in the economy (Weiss & Hobson 
2000). The increasing number of elite bureaucrats and academics who got advanced degrees from 
the USA meant that there were more and more people inside and outside the government who 
were convinced of the virtues of the free market and consequently viewed the developmental state 
as a backward and mistaken ideology.75 This disagreement within the bureaucracy was seen as an 
obstacle to the implementation IMF reforms, and it was necessary for  president Kim Dae Jung to 
staff these new agencies with bureaucrats sympathetic to his views of how to best restructure the 
South Korean economy.  
 
                                                 
75 All the 35 employees at the powerful semi-governmental ‘think-tank’, Korea Development Institute, held Ph.Ds from 
American Universities (Woo 1991:192).  
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5.3.3 The relationship between the government and the business sector: Concerned 
Chaebols 
The aim for the South Korean government in the 1990s had been to loosen up the tight 
relationship between the state and the Chaebols in order to improve the Chaebols’ position in the 
international market. A diversification of core industries and a phasing out of non-core businesses 
seemed necessary to reduce Cheabols’ indebtedness (Haggard & Mo 2000). But instead of 
upgrading their production along these lines, the Chaebols expanded their capacity to get a larger 
market-share. This made the Chaebols more vulnerable to economic crises, and they were largely 
blamed for being the cause of the economic problems in South Korea during the Asian crisis. 
 
In addition to the labour unions it was necessary for the government to have groups related to the 
Chaebols to adhere to the corporate restructuring as required by the IMF. The Chaebols had a 
quite powerful position in South Korea prior to the crisis, although their influence was not what it 
used to be at the height of the developmental state. Why did they not try to oppose the 
implementation process, like the powerful conglomerates did in Indonesia? Mo & Moon (1999) 
stress that the social environment fostered by the crisis helped to reduce the political and the 
social opposition against the reforms. The banking and finance sector was too weak to organise 
any political opposition, and the Chaebols were unable to act because of their weak economic 
situation after the crisis. They had also spent a large amount of money in supporting Kim Dae 
Jung's opponent Lee Hoi Chang in the presidential election in 1997, which made it hard to lobby 
for their view on the Dae Jung government. In addition to this the Chaebols were blamed for the 
economic crisis, so they were not in a position to argue their case. The public supported the 
change of president and gave Kim Dae Jung benefits in dealing with labour and the Chaebols. 
There was a widely shared social consensus that failure to implement reforms could have serious 
consequences for the future of the entire South Korean economy. 
  
Another important feature of the government-business relations in South Korea was that Kim Dae 
Jung’s ties to and dependence on the private sector was much weaker than that of his 
predecessors. His reform agenda must be seen in relation to both economic as well as political 
reasons. Kim Dae Jung did not have to give any concessions to the Chaebols, which made 
implementing the IMF reforms less troublesome. The weakened position of the Chaebols made it 
easier for Kim Dae Jung to develop a ‘quasi-embedded’ relationship between the government and 
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the business sector, where the government relied on the private sector for implementation of their 
policies and the Chaebols relied on the government for help to recover from the crisis.  
 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have discussed how the mismanagement of the implementation of IMF reforms 
in Indonesia partially can be understood through focusing on bureaucratic conditions. I have 
argued that the Indonesian bureaucracy can not be considered to be autonomous, nor is it staffed 
by well-educated and specialised bureaucrats. According to the theoretical perspective of state 
capacity, an important aspect of bureaucratic capacity to implement reforms is the separation 
between the politicians and the bureaucrats, where difficult and contentious policy problems are 
solved through removing them from the hands of politicians and leaving them with the high-
qualified bureaucrats. I have shown that in Indonesia, this was not how the bureaucracy worked. 
Suharto rather sought to remove policy problems from the hands of the bureaucrats when they 
contradicted with his own interests - either by circumventing reforms himself, or by dismissing 
bureaucrats that opposed him. The South Korean case is different from the Indonesian. South 
Korea experienced a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy, because Kim Dae Jung gained 
support for his reforms from sympathetic bureaucrats, whom he effectively put in a powerful 
position where they could oversee and secure the implementation of the IMF reforms.  
 
Another question that has been addressed in this chapter is whether features associated with the 
relationship between the government and the business sector can hinder, or promote 
implementation of IMF reforms. Indonesia illustrates a case where the business sector is 
dependent on the government for access to subsidies or privileged monopolies, and the 
administrative capacity to guide the business sector towards national goals depends on what those 
goals are. As long as the reforms are in tune with the political or bureaucratic elite’s interests they 
can be accomplished, but when they contradict with the power holders’ wishes they are not 
implemented. In the case of South Korea I also discussed whether there could be said to be 
features associated with the relationship between the government and the business sector that 
might hinder, or promote the government in its implementation of IMF reforms. The situation in 
South Korea proved different from the Indonesian, because here the Chaebols were seen as the 
major cause of the crisis. This gave Kim Dae Jung legitimacy to implement IMF reforms that 
aimed at breaking up the close relationship between the government and the business sector. To 
secure support for his reform agenda, Kim Dae Jung established consultative mechanisms 
between the government, the business sector and labour unions. However, these institutionalised 
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relations between the government and the business sector were not based on the kind of mutual 
relationship that characterizes ‘embedded’ relations. The situation was more that of a government 
that had the power and legitimacy to explain to the Chaebols their options. 
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CHAPTER 6 REGIME CAPACITY 
As pointed out in the previous two chapters, the Indonesian and the South Korean experiences in 
relation to the implementation of IMF reforms turned out quite differently. During the Asian 
crisis the international press discussed whether their dissimilar experiences could be due to their 
different regime forms, authoritarian vs democratic. As the Indonesian crisis erupted, 
conventional economic measures as promoted by the IMF did not work. As a result some scholars 
and observers began to argue that the basic problem was political rather than economic. The 
seeming success of the democratic South Korean implementation further enhanced this picture. 
However, the success of democratic regimes in the implementation of economic reforms stands in 
contrast to the developmental state literature where an important argument is that the Asian states 
were able to impose their policies on the society and the business sector because of their 
authoritarian political structure. This argument was also used in the case of Indonesia at the onset 
of the crisis, when Suharto was applauded for his initial quick response to the crisis. As the crisis 
developed, the focus shifted to viewing Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime as the major 
obstacle to successful implementation of IMF reforms. This argument follows the tradition that 
sees regime capacity to implement economic reforms as related to particular structures of 
political institutions. More precisely, a focus on regime capacity does tell how the political 
institutional design facilitates or impedes decisive policy action and thus influences economic 
policy management. One debated issue within the theoretical approach that focuses on regime 
capacity has been whether democracies or authoritarian regimes are more decisive and effective 
in reform implementation. Decisiveness refers to the speed in which the government can act, in 
other words to what extent political institutions promote qualities such as efficiency in policy-
making, implementation and the ability to make and carry out difficult but necessary policy 
decisions in a timely fashion (MacIntyre 1999a:4). The present chapter is divided into four parts. 
In the first part of this chapter my guiding question in relation to regime capacity will be ‘to 
which degree did the political-institutional framework in Indonesia increase the possibility of 
decisive action in the implementation of IMF reforms?’ 
 
Another important topic within the perspective of regime capacity has been to see how popular 
support and interest articulation are incorporated in the political institutional structure to increase 
regime capacity. The successful South Korean implementation of the IMF reforms during the 
crisis showed that popular support and legitimacy of the president’s reform agenda was an 
important feature. However, prior to the crisis the Asian states were known for their state 
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corporatism, where interest articulation was institutionalised into the political structure in order to 
control interest groups and hinder opposition against the state’s policies. Important in this respect 
is to discuss why state corporatism had proved effective prior to the Asian crisis, while it proved 
not to be so in the case of Indonesia in 1997-98. In the second part of this chapter I will design 
my analysis around the question ‘How did the Indonesian political system incorporate popular 
support and interest articulation so as to successfully implement reforms? 
 
In the third part of this chapter I will discuss the issues of decisiveness within the political 
institutional structure and the role of popular support and interest articulation, in order to explore 
the South Korean regime’s capacity to implement IMF reforms.  In the final part I will summarise 
the arguments made in this chapter, and discuss how they relate to the two questions proposed 
above.  
 
6.1 Democratic vs. authoritarian regimes’ decisiveness 
In the first part of this chapter my focus is on the political-institutional framework in Indonesia 
and the degree in which it might increase the possibility for decisive action in the implementation 
of IMF reforms. One of the things to consider in relation to this is the number of veto points, i.e. 
the number of institutions and agencies that may veto policy proposals, thus forcing a status quo. 
Veto points can include the president, the legislature, a second chamber of legislature, a 
committee within a legislature, or the courts; in authoritarian regimes it may include the military. 
The preferences of these veto points may be more or less solely aligned. Thus the president and 
legislature may represent distinct veto points, but may either be of the same party (unified 
government) or of different parties (divided governments) (Haggard 2000:49). A government that 
faces many veto points can be indecisive, while few veto gates may make policy implementation 
more effective. I will show that Indonesia had a very decisive political structure with no 
institutional constraints on the president's actions. In relation to the implementation of IMF 
reforms this political institutional structure enabled Suharto to effectively implement reforms, but 
at the same time the decisive political institutional structure meant that Suharto did not need the 
approval of other political institutions for his actions. I will in the following discuss how this 
became relevant for the implementation of IMF reforms as Suharto was in a position where he 
could reverse his policy commitments when he chose to, due to the lack of institutional checks on 
his power.  
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6.1.1 A decisive Indonesian political institutional structure 
In Indonesia the party and electoral systems, the state corporatist framework and the support of 
the president from the armed forces, had reduced the ability for political participation and 
enhanced the president's power. Although there was a constitutional separation of the powers 
between the presidency and the legislature at the time of the crisis, in practice there was only a 
weak division of governmental powers, with the presidential branch thoroughly dominating the 
legislature and the judiciary. Lines of executive accountability were very clear, with bureaucrats 
only responsible to the presidency, and the presidency was only weakly accountable to the 
parliament (MacIntyre 1999b:274). Indonesia had developed a political system where executive 
authority was highly centralized around the presidency, and the absence of any effective 
independent veto points on the president’s power produced a highly decisive structure of 
government. 
 
This centralisation of executive authority enabled the government to act quite quickly and 
decisively when the signs of a crisis emerged during the summer of 1997. Even before the rupiah 
came under attack the government moved to widen the band within which the currency traded as 
pre-emptive measure. As the crisis intensified regionally, the authorities cut the rupiah completely 
free, drove up interest rates, scrapped foreign ownership limits on the stock exchange, reduced 
tariffs and froze a range of high-cost infrastructure projects. The Indonesian government acted 
quickly and won praise in the international community for doing so. Why then was the 
Indonesian economy so badly hit a few months later? As discussed in chapter 4, after the 
introduction of the first IMF package, Suharto announced that the controversial import 
monopolies on wheat, soybeans, and garlic would be abolished. He also agreed to close down 16 
small banks where his family had great interests, as well as cutting tariffs in industries affecting 
his business associates’ firms. Implementing these reforms implied that the president was willing 
to take quick action and signal his willingness to cut back on privileges belonging to his business 
associates as well as his family. However, as I discussed earlier, just shortly after he had 
announced his commitment to the IMF reforms, he gave mixed signals concerning the 
implementation. As I have shown in 4.1.1.1, this included the 'ok' to continue eight large 
investment projects postponed in September, the reopening of Suharto's son’s bank, and an 
annual budget that did not satisfy the IMF requirements. The decisive political institutional 
structure that had enabled Suharto to take effective action in the beginning of the crisis now gave 
him the opportunity to reverse his IMF commitments as he pleased. So why did not the decisive 
Indonesian political institutional structure facilitate successful reform implementation as the 
 79
Asian crisis deepened? Jaquette (1998:223) argues that Suharto's earlier success in handling 
economic crises and the implementation of reforms in the late 1960 and in the mid 1980s can be 
understood as these crises did not threaten the president's personal economic interests in the way 
that was the case in 1997-98. After the initial successful and effective actions, the advantages of 
an authoritarian political institutional structure in relation to decisiveness rather came out as an 
erratic behaviour of the chief executive.  
 
The very concentration of authority and the decisiveness of the Indonesian political structure 
ultimately generated profound uncertainty about the economic situation. The issue of credibility 
of policy commitments is important in this matter. If governments are subject to little or no 
constraints (few veto points) their policy promises have little credibility, because policies can 
easily be reversed and consequently make the economic climate unstable and unpredictable. This 
implies that regimes with a decisive political institutional structure carry the risk of being 
interpreted as unpredictable and not credible. Credibility implies political institutional structures 
that create a stable environment where economic policies cannot be changed within a short period 
of time. A large number of veto points are important, because it makes it hard to reverse a policy 
decision and therefore creates a predictable economic development. As stated earlier, the 
Indonesian political system is institutionally centralized and with few veto points, and thus 
vulnerable to credibility problems because it is easy for the president to reverse his policy 
commitments. An important feature of the Indonesian implementation of IMF reforms was that 
Suharto lacked credibility in his commitments to the IMF. His credibility suffered both through 
his actions when reversing earlier agreed IMF policies, but also through the currency board 
controversy, the announcement of the new ‘crony’ Cabinet in March 98, and the appointment of 
B. J. Habibie as his vice president. The impression was that the economic climate was unstable, 
much due to a president that changed his mind seemingly randomly.  
 
The Indonesian implementation of IMF reforms lacked credibility of policy commitments due to 
the decisive structure of the political institutions. Yet, prior to the Asian economic crisis 
Indonesia managed to sustain investor confidence although the political authority was centralised 
and unconstrained. Why then did international investors withdraw in 1997-98? The important 
issue here is what kind of economic policy and political economy that was perceived as credible 
for further economic development. A significant feature of the IMF reforms was the aim to open 
up and to attract international investments to Indonesia. The lack of credibility of Suharto's 
commitment to the IMF and the unpredictable policy environment that this created meant that 
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investors were further reluctant to invest. Moreover, as the Asian crisis unfolded, and the causes 
of the crisis were more and more frequently interpreted in terms of flaws inherent in 'Asian 
capitalism', the IMF's economic ideology was seen as the only sustainable and credible economic 
policy that would lead to recovery. This further reinforced the investors' impression that any 
economic policy that was not in line with the IMF ideology was not credible, and consequently a 
potential risk to their investments. As a result Suharto had less credibility. Not only was he 
perceived as someone who was creating an unpredictable policy environment through his 
reversals of policy commitments to the IMF, he was also blamed for giving priority to 'Asian 
capitalism' rather than to the IMF reforms based on 'credible' economic policies.  
 
6.1.2 To which degree did the political-institutional framework in Indonesia 
increase the possibility of decisive action in reform implementation? 
The concepts of credibility and decisiveness of political institutions are not mutually exclusive, 
but their institutional foundations might be. For a government to be decisive there have to be few 
institutionalised restrictions on the president’s power, while the institutional foundation for high 
credibility is many veto points that makes it harder to reverse policy commitments. During the 
Asian crisis Indonesia had a decisive authoritarian political institutional structure with few 
constraints on the president’s power. But in relation to credibility of policy commitments, its 
decisiveness always carried the risk of policy uncertainties. The decisiveness of the Indonesian 
political structure proved to be an advantage at the beginning of the crisis. However, the 
decisiveness of the Indonesian authoritarian regime did not seem to benefit implementation as 
long as the political structure enhanced Suharto's lack of will to implement the reforms that were 
not in his interest. The Indonesian case shows that a decisive political institutional structure 
facilitates implementation when the president approves of the reforms. If the reforms contradict 
the president's intentions, a decisive authoritarian regime becomes an obstacle to implementation.  
 
6.2 Popular support and interest articulation 
One important feature of the authoritarian Asian states was the suppression of civil society and 
the ability of the state to override particular interests groups. The successful implementation of 
economic reforms in the Asian states prior to the crisis in 1997 is often explained in terms of the 
lack of civil society groups that were allowed to take part in the policy making process. When one 
discusses the incorporation of popular support and interest articulation into the political structure, 
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and their ability to increase regimes’ capacity to implement reforms, there are two important 
issues worth noting: First, that the level of support for the government may influence the degree 
in which the government chooses to undertake reforms. Second, that the institutional feature of 
corporatism demonstrates how interest articulation can be incorporated into the political 
institutional structure to increase regime capacity.  
 
In the second part of this chapter I will focus on the Indonesian regime’s capacity to implement 
IMF reforms and the degree of popular support and interest articulation incorporated into the 
political institutional structure. First, I will discuss how the Indonesian political structure can be 
characterized as a kind of state corporatism, where political institutions have been used as a 
means to depoliticise the Indonesian society, thus facilitating the successful implementation of 
economic reforms. Second, I will show how this lack of political channels available for interest 
articulation influenced the implementation of IMF reforms, and that popular opposition towards 
Suharto in the end forced him to step down from his presidency. The guiding question for my 
analysis in this second part of this chapter is: ‘How did the Indonesian political system 
incorporate popular support and interest articulation so as to successfully implement reforms? 
 
6.2.1 Social groups in Indonesia: Depoliticisation of the society through state 
corporatism 
After Suharto officially took power in 1966, many gave little credence to Suharto's political skills 
and viewed him as an officer that could not stay in power for long. However, by the early 1970s 
he had outmanoeuvred political contenders within the military and consolidated his own position 
and built the presidency into the most important political institution in the country. The 
'mainstream' interpretation of Indonesian politics during Suharto’s New Order has been to focus 
on state-society relations as being grounded in clientilism.76 The essence of clientilism is the 
pyramid-like networks of patron-client relationships, where the client is dependent on his patron 
for dispensing material rewards and opportunities for political influence. Thus, politics is not a 
result of contesting actors over policy issues, but rather a competition over material rewards and 
influence. The interests of the 'people' are repressed and so the state is not responsive to outside 
interests or pressures. MacIntyre (1991:12) argues that the political institutionalised structure of 
                                                 
76Andrew MacIntyre (1991:6-18) gives an introduction to six different perspectives that can be distinguished in the 
literature of Indonesian politics. These are: The state-qua-state, The bureaucratic Polity and patrimonial cluster, 
Bureaucratic pluralism, Bureaucratic authoritarianism, a Structuralist approach and finally, restricted pluralism. 
MacIntyre argues that the mainstream understanding of Indonesian politics is inspired by theories concerning 
patrimonalism and clientilism.  
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clientilism in Indonesia is a kind of state corporatism, where the authoritarian regime has a 'top 
down' structure, and political institutions are set up to manage the masses, especially groups like 
labour and religious movements. Political parties in Indonesia do not function as an 
institutionalised link between the state and the society because the electoral process has little 
effect on government policies. There is a very strong and systematic bias in the rules that govern 
parties and the electoral process that largely predetermines the outcome.77 After 1973 there were 
only three political parties allowed. Two of the legal political parties, PPP and PDI, had little 
independent political life or policy agenda.78 They attracted little support from either business or 
labour, and never obtained more than a modest share of the votes. The third party, Golkar, was 
the government’s electoral vehicle Golongan Karya, (functional groups) which during the New 
Order always ‘won’ the elections. In the early 1970s, for instance, all civil servants were required 
to sign a letter committing their loyalty to Golkar, and those who declined to sign, were subject to 
dismissal (MacIntyre 1999b:265).  
 
State corporatism in Indonesia has been a way for the state to control and to penetrate interest 
associations, like trade unions, student associations, women’s organisations and religious 
congregations with an aim to limit rather than facilitate interest representation. The government 
both initiated the formation of new organizations and sponsored those already existing, providing 
them with official recognition and funding. In exchange the organisations were obliged to channel 
the government’s policies and political aspirations to their members and to give political support 
to Golkar (Eklöf 1999:8). This state corporatist strategy has served to exclude interest 
representation from the shaping of public policy, but increased the regime capacity to implement 
reforms. 
 
6.2.2 Suharto forced to step down 
I have shown in the previous chapters that as the Asian crisis unfolded and Suharto showed his 
reluctance to implement the IMF reforms that came into conflict with his family and business 
associates' interests, the political system in Indonesia was viewed internationally and nationally as 
a part of the 'problem' of the crisis. From the time of the re-election of Suharto as president in 
March 1998 and the appointment of his 'crony cabinet' the same month there were great protests 
                                                 
77 There are formal exit controls on political parties. The president can legally dissolve any party that is not compatible 
with state goals (as defined by the president) or any party representing less than 25 % of the population. 
78 PPP stands for Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party), and PDI stands for Partei Democrasi 
Indonesia (the Indonesian Democratic Party).  
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from student movements against Suharto. In March and April the student movements increased 
their demonstrations against the political elite, and by the end of April at every University of the 
country there were students demanding economic and political change. In addition to the student 
demonstrations, the serious rise in food and fuel prices around this time sparked riots and street 
violence in a number of Indonesian cities. The political elite used the military to try to stop the 
riots and the protests from the students, but after the killing of four students at the prestigious 
Trisakti University in Jakarta, riots spread all over Indonesia and over 1,000 people lost their 
lives. On the 21st of May 1998 Suharto stepped down from his presidency due to strong 
opposition, and former Minister of Research and Technology and vice president B. J. Habibie 
became Indonesia's next president.  
 
The state corporatist political structure in Indonesia proved during the Asian crisis to be a 
political system with no institutionalised channels for showing opposition and with a lacking 
ability to solve the conflicts that arose between those who opposed Suharto and his followers. As 
said earlier, an authoritarian political structure can be seen as having one advantage in reform 
implementation, because the political leader is not dependent upon political support, and thus he 
does not have to accommodate the publics’ interests to remain in power. This was the case in 
Indonesia during the Asian crisis, but still the reform implementation was not successful. The 
important question is then for how long a state corporatist structure can be an advantage in policy 
implementation. Since 1966 Suharto had ruled Indonesia with success in terms of economic 
development. However, as the New Order developed, Suharto’s authoritarian regime did not 
allow any substantial political participation. Eklöf (1999:220) argues that this created a political 
system with a gap between the regime and a range of new social and political aspirations that had 
emerged in the wake of the economic development. The state corporatist framework had no 
channels for expressing these and others different views, and during the crisis the opposition 
towards Suharto proved too strong for him to remain in power. However, it is worth stressing that 
due to over thirty years of depoliticisation of the society there was no group formally representing 
the opposition that could take over when Suharto stepped down from his presidency. The state 
corporatist organisation of interest representation had effectively suppressed any opposition, and 
had hindered social groups to build a supportive power-base outside the state structure.  
 
The issue of interest representation is also interesting in relation to the IMF and their wish to 
make trans-national alliances, as earlier discussed in chapter 5.1.2. Kahler (1993) argues that the 
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IMF often tries to make supportive coalitions both within and outside the government.79 There are 
various reasons for domestic groups to cooperate with the IMF. First, it pays off to be 
sympathetic towards the IMF reforms if one belongs to a group that can gain politically, socially 
or economically from the reforms. Second, taking the side of the IMF may give access to the 
policy making process for groups that usually do not take part or have access to the political 
arena. In Indonesia the problem was not a lack of people agreeing with the IMF reforms. It was 
rather a lack of opportunity or access to political institutions where they could show their 
opposition towards Suharto and their support to the IMF. As I have discussed in the previous 
chapter, those groups within the government and the state apparatus that supported the IMF were 
set aside when they openly disagreed with Suharto. The IMF was not successful in making 
alliances with groups outside the government. Taking Indonesia's authoritarian political structure 
into consideration the question is rather if the IMF would have gained anything from making 
domestic alliances, due to the repressive nature of the New Order regime. As long as there are no 
formal institutions in which groups can show their opposition, it would have been hard for the 
IMF to get domestic social groups to promote views that contradicted Suharto's.  
6.3 The South Korean experience 
In the third part of this chapter I will look at the South Korean experience in relation to the issue 
of regime capacity in reform implementation during the Asian economic crisis. First, I will 
discuss how the South Korean political institutional structure proved to be less decisive than the 
Indonesian. I will argue that in exploring the successful South Korean experience it is important 
to focus on Kim Dae Jung's credibility in his commitment to implement the IMF reforms. I will 
also discuss how popular support and the incorporation of interest groups into the decision-
making process enhanced South Korea's regime capacity in implementing the IMF reforms.  
 
6.3.1 Decisiveness and policy predictability 
In relation to decisiveness of the political institutional structure, the presidency in South Korea is 
not as centralised as in Indonesia, although the president is quite powerful with a fixed term in 
office and substantial scope for legislative initiative. The Asian economic crisis hit South Korea 
at a time leading up to presidential election. Then president Kim Young Sam was facing an 
opposition that gained support because of the lacking ability of the president to manage the 
                                                 
79 Like Putnam (1988) showed under the Italian negotiations for a stand-by agreement in 1977, where the IMF 
consulted directly with the labour unions and the socialist party, and revised its reform proposal in order to win their 
support. 
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economic crisis. As discussed in chapter 3.4.1. Kim Young Sam's handling of the Hanbo 
‘scandal’ and the nationalisation of the KIA Chaebol earlier that year had generated doubts about 
the president's ability to manage the South Korean economy. The indecisiveness of the Kim 
Young Sam government in dealing with the Asian crisis was especially evident when they failed 
to pass a financial reform bill in the parliament in October 1997, much due to the lack of 
cooperation between the ruling party and the opposition. As discussed earlier, a democratic 
regime can be reluctant to implement economic reforms that could harm important groups that the 
regime relies on for support, particularly before an election. In South Korea this proved to be the 
case at the beginning of the crisis. The ruling party had serious doubts about the political cost of 
forcing the necessary economic reforms through. It appeared that Kim Young Sam wanted to 
avoid the reforms becoming a campaign issue for the opposition before the election. The 
opposition had also few incentives to cooperate, because if they signed on, they would be 
associated with the potentially costly effects of the reforms, whereas if they postponed their 
assent, any negative economic effects would be laid at the feet of the president and the ruling 
party. This reasoning shows how democratic regimes can be said to have lower regime capacity 
than authoritarian regimes in implementing reforms. However, democracies like South Korea 
have one advantage compared to their authoritarian counterparts: the ability of the opposition to 
mobilize support for a new government to take office that can initiate new reforms with electoral 
and legislative support. In South Korea this was the case where the opposition leader, Kim Dae 
Jung, won the presidential election after making an alliance with one of the other presidential 
candidates, Kim Jong Pil. Because the South Korean political system allows for special sessions 
of the National assembly, Dae Jung exploited the period between his election victory on the 18th 
of December and his instalment in February 1998 to successfully pass the economic reform 
package that the National Assembly under Kim Young Sam had failed to pass some months 
earlier.  
 
Compared to the Indonesian case the credibility of Kim Dae Jung's commitment to implementing 
IMF reforms was high. Kim Dae Jung had won the election much because of his appeal to people 
through his demands for a restructuring of the South Korean economy. Kim Dae Jung also came 
into office with strong credentials as an economic expert. He was considered as one of few South 
Korean politicians with a clearly defined economic agenda, where he emphasised the importance 
of small and medium private enterprises and market competition. He had support from the groups 
hardest hit by the crisis, and he gained credibility for his reforms as he targeted the powerful 
position of the Chaebols and sought to restructure the financial sector. His ideas of how to cure 
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the South Korean economy coincided with IMF’s liberal economic ideology, which gave him a 
good starting point for dealing with the Fund and increased his legitimacy in the international 
community. In contrast to the Indonesian president, Kim Dae Jung was credible in the eyes of 
foreign investors. 
 
However, credibility of policy commitments can be said to be costly. Mo & Moon (1999), argue 
that in order to implement the IMF reforms the South Korean president increased the 
government's decisive action by circumventing the democratic procedures. They argue that the 
decisiveness of Kim Dae Jung’s government has shown that the president has too much formal 
and informal power at the expense of the legislature, political parties and other formal 
institutions. The powerful role of the two agencies discussed in the previous chapter, the Budget 
and Planning Bureau and the Financial Supervisory Board, has been a sensitive issue with regard 
to South Korea's democratic future. Although these informal committees were officially only 
advisory bodies to the president without any legal authority to make binding decisions, they have 
assumed great influence- principally because of their proximity to the president. To some, the use 
of such informal agencies is highly questionable, even though their decisions are not legally 
binding.80 Most of the negotiations with the Chaebol leaders have also been similarly informal 
and closed (Kim 2000). 
 
6.3.2 Popular support and interest articulation in South Korea  
An important feature of the successful implementation of IMF reforms in South Korea was the 
legitimacy from broad groups in the society towards the implementation of the reforms. The 
South Korean political institutional structure allows interest representation to a much larger extent 
than the Indonesian political structure does, and it is an important feature of the country's 
democratic structure. An example of this was that prior to his inauguration Kim Dae Jung 
constituted a 'transition team' that would map out reform measures to cope with the IMF 
conditions. The transition team served as a legitimate forum for societal stakeholders to take the 
lead in advising both the new government and the public about the reforms (Shin & Ha 1999). 
The team was acting as a kind of deliberative body. It held numerous hearings, examined reform 
issues, and discussed various proposals for how to best restructure the economy.  
                                                 
80 That the decisions were not legally binding was a disappointment to the labour unions, who had hoped for a more 
formal access to the decision-making process. The Kim Dae Jung administration did not actually have the authority to 
offer such reforms to labour; only the elected legislature, The National Assembly, can enact such rules (Mo & Moon 
1999).  
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There was one important social group that was particularly affected by the IMF reforms: workers 
in the corporate sector. As discussed in chapter 4, one obstacle to implementing corporate reforms 
was strict regulations making it difficult to lay off workers (Mo &Moon 1999). This was a 
sensitive issue to Kim Dae Jung, and with a sharp rise in the overall employment because of the 
economic crisis, the climate for reaching an agreement looked even worse (Haggard 2000:197). 
Labour unions were against a deterioration of workers’ rights, and it seemed difficult to 
implement the IMF reforms without the consent of the affected groups. In the middle of the crisis 
the government could not risk another wave of strikes, so it was crucial that the government 
cooperated with the labour unions about the reforms. To fend off labour protests the government 
invited the mainstream South Korean Foundation of Trade Unions and the more radical South 
Korean Federation of Trade Unions to participate in a tripartite committee where labour, the 
government and the Chaebols were represented. After months of negotiations the committee 
reached an agreement where the labour unions agreed to more permissive rules for layoffs and 
employment of temporary workers. In return for their cooperation, the government pledged to 
improve labour rights and fight unemployment through public work programmes, as well as to 
give subsidies to unemployed workers, and to develop extensive social safety nets (Mo & Moon 
1999:155). The South Korean case showed that a more societal corporatist oriented institutional 
structure proved successful as it incorporated interest groups in the political decision-making 
process and thus provided more legitimacy for state policies, which again increased the ability of 
the South Korean government to implement the IMF reforms.  
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
A regime with a decisive institutional political structure has the ability to follow its own agenda, 
without having to take  'popular' interests into consideration. The Indonesian case showed that an 
authoritarian political institutional structure is more decisive than a democratic, but in relation to 
the implementation of the IMF reforms, it proved not to be an advantage. As the lack of political 
institutions that could veto Suharto’s decisions increased the decisiveness of the Indonesian 
regime, it also weakened the credibility of Suharto's commitment to the IMF as he could easily 
reverse his policy commitments. The Indonesian case shows that as the IMF reforms contradicted 
the interests of the political power-holders, a decisive political structure with few veto points 
proved to be an obstacle to the implementation of IMF reforms. In the case of South Korea the 
decisiveness of the political institutional structure was not as obvious as the Indonesian. 
However, Kim Dae Jung took advantage of his position as incoming president with a political 
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mandate to change the status quo, and decisively formed executive committees although with a 
questionable mandate. It is important to remember that the concept of credibility of policy 
commitments does not say that democratic decisions are credible per se. If Kim Dae Jung had not 
been elected, South Korea would have been ruled by a president who was not seen as credible in 
his policy commitments to the IMF, even though South Korea still had a democratic political 
institutional structure. This chapter has shown that credibility of policy commitments is related to 
the credibility of a government’s will to adhere to reforms, not to the political structure that 
facilitates credibility as such.  
 
In relation to how popular support and interest articulation can be incorporated into the political 
institutional structure to increase regime capacity to implement reforms, the Indonesian case 
shows that cooperation between large social groups to resolve the crisis was not possible. The 
authoritarian institutional structure with a state corporatist framework for interest articulation had 
effectively suppressed interest groups and there were no formalised institutions where opposing 
groups could participate in the decision-making process. The Indonesian case indicates that a 
state corporatist institutional structure can be effective in reform implementation as long as the 
reforms coincide with the wishes of the president. If the reforms contradict the president’s 
interests, state corporatism tends to obstruct implementation. On the other hand, the South Korean 
case illustrated how societal corporatism incorporated interest groups in the political structure, 
and the bargaining process between the various groups affected by the reforms opened up for the 
ability of the government to make concessions to the groups hardest hit by the reforms. Thus the 
South Korean government gained support and legitimacy for further implementation of IMF 
reforms.   
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Most literature about the Asian economic crisis has been concerned with explaining the 
causes of the crisis itself or discussing the properness of the IMF reforms. Few have focused 
on the national political aspects of the Asian states’ crisis management, and how political 
factors influenced the following implementation of the IMF reforms. This is perhaps not 
surprising as the issue of the politics of reform implementation is wide and intricate. 
However, the reason for writing this thesis was a wish to explore more thoroughly exactly this 
complex topic through discussing how national political factors in Indonesia and South Korea 
influenced the implementation of IMF reforms during the economic crisis in 1997-98.  
 
The lack of an overarching theory on this subject provided me with an opportunity to choose 
a wide approach in this thesis. To use a wide approach has proved to have both advantages 
and disadvantages. The methodological technique of the case study approach has allowed me 
to examine the interplay of three separate, but intertwined empirical focuses in order to 
provide a complete understanding of the politics of economic reform implementation.81 The 
strength of my approach has been that it clearly illustrates how national political factors set in 
an international framework influence the implementation of IMF reforms. However, using a 
wide approach also indicates that there has been a lack of a comprehensive theory that I can 
compare my findings to. Existing literature could not direct me to a specific theoretical 
approach, nor to a set of independent variables that I could test. To accommodate this lack of 
an overarching theory of the politics of economic reform implementation, I designed an 
analytical framework where I combined two relevant theoretical approaches and four 
independent variables.  
7.1 How do national political factors influence governments’ implementation of 
IMF reforms? 
In order to explore this thesis’ main question, how national political factors influence 
governments’ implementation of IMF reforms, I chose to focus on four political factors (i) 
bureaucratic organization; (ii) features associated with the relationship between the 
government and the business sector; (iii) the possibility of decisive political action within the 
political-institutional framework; (iv) how popular support and interest articulation are 
incorporated into the political institutional structure.  In chapter 2 I introduced five empirical 
questions derived from the theoretical approaches of state and regime capacity and from 
                                                 
81 The three empirical focuses have been (i) the context where the interplay between the IMF and the recipient 
governments takes place (ii) the Indonesian and the South Korean state capacity to implement IMF reforms; (iii) 
the Indonesian and the South Korean regime capacity to implement IMF reforms. 
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literature concerned with the implementation of IMF reforms, that this thesis has been 
designed around.   
7.1.1 State capacity 
In chapter 5 I examined the theoretical approach of state capacity and discussed whether it 
could be used to explore: ‘How bureaucratic conditions influenced the reform implementation 
in Indonesia and South Korea’. My first finding in this thesis showed that through discussing 
how the technical and administrative capacity of the bureaucracy can influence the 
implementation of IMF reforms, one could identify quite different experiences in Indonesia 
and South Korea. The Indonesian bureaucracy could not be considered an autonomous 
bureaucracy at the time of the Asian economic crisis, and the clientelistic aspect of the 
Indonesian state apparatus has hindered the bureaucracy in developing an independent power-
base that could challenge Suharto’s polices when he chose not to implement the IMF reforms. 
This can indicate that a less autonomous and clientilistic bureaucracy has weakened capacity 
to implement reforms if the reforms contradict with the president’s wishes. Conversely, the 
South Korean experience showed an autonomous bureaucracy isolated from particularist 
interests that successfully implemented reforms. The important feature of the South Korean 
bureaucracy was that the bureaucrats that were left with the task of implementing the reforms, 
agreed with IMF policies and shared Kim Dae Jung’s view on how to best restructure the 
economy. This can indicate that in order to successfully implement reforms it is necessary to 
have an autonomous bureaucracy where bureaucrats within important key ministries agree 
with the president’s reform agenda.  
The second question that I set out to examine in chapter 5 was: ‘How features associated with 
the relationship between the Indonesian and South Korean governments and the business 
sector could hinder, or promote the implementation of IMF reforms’. My second finding in 
this thesis was that instead of an 'embedded' relationship in Peter Evans’ (1995) terms 
between the business sector and the Indonesian government, my analysis shows that the 
former was rather dependent upon patrons within the state for gaining access to beneficial 
deals. I have found that this ability of certain sections of the state to control the business 
sector has enabled the Indonesian political and bureaucratic elite to use their position to 
advance their private economic interests in the national economy. I have argued that the task 
of the IMF to restructure the Indonesian economy in 1997-98 proved difficult because 
Suharto was concerned with protecting his family’s and his business associates’ personal 
interests in the economy. This can indicate that the implementation of IMF reforms in 
Indonesia was hindered both because of the great private economic interests that Suharto had 
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in the economy, as well as the fact that the business sector had not been able to develop its 
own power-base that would have enabled them to challenge Suharto’s decisions. This has 
compromised the Indonesian state’s capacity to create and implement policies in the ‘national 
interest’ that do not enrich the politically powerful. On the other hand, the South Korean 
experience showed that 'embedded' relations through institutionalised consultative 
mechanisms between the government and the Chaebols increased the support for the reforms 
and the likelihood of successful reform implementation.  
 
Through focusing on state capacity I have gained a better understanding of the technical and 
the administrative capacity of states to implement reforms. The approach of state capacity has 
been useful in which it focuses on how the implementation process has been managed. It has 
also been important because it draws ones attention to how bureaucratic organization and the 
relationship between the business sector and the government have developed historically. 
This underlines an important argument made in this thesis, that in order to understand the 
politics of economic reform implementation it is important to consider how political 
institutions and political processes have developed as to create a certain kind of national 
political economy.  
 
7.1.2 Regime capacity 
When I chose to compare the Indonesian and South Korean experiences during the Asian 
economic crisis, I did so because I was interested in exploring whether different kinds of 
political regimes could be said to have different regime capacity to implement economic 
reforms. In chapter 6 I sought to examine: ‘To which degree the political-institutional 
frameworks in Indonesia and South Korea increased the possibility of decisive action in 
reform implementation’. My empirical finding in relation to this issue was that the argument 
of whether authoritarian regimes are more effective than non-authoritarian in implementing 
economic reforms, cannot be applied to the Indonesian case during the Asian crisis in 1997-
98. My analysis shows that while the Indonesian political system had a decisive authoritarian 
institutional structure, it also created an unpredictable environment where Suharto could 
easily reverse policies due to lack of institutional constraints on his power and authority. This 
can indicate that when certain required economic reforms contradicted with the interests of 
the president, a decisive institutional political structure can be used to hinder implementation 
of these reforms. The South Korean case on the other hand, showed a government that was 
effective in implementing reforms despite a less decisive political institutional structure. 
South Korea’s successful implementation of the IMF reforms must rather be seen in relation 
to the credibility of Kim Dae Jung’s commitment to the IMF, and the fact that his reform 
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agenda aiming at breaking up the tight relationship between the state and the Chaebols, 
pleased international observers and investors. The South Korean democratic institutional 
structure also enabled the voters to throw out a president that was not committed to 
implementing the IMF reforms, and instead support a president candidate that had on top of 
his agenda the task of restructuring the South Korean economy.  
 
An important aspect of regime capacity is to focus on how popular support and interest 
articulation are best incorporated into the political institutional structure to facilitate effective 
reform implementation. The last part of chapter 6 was designed around this issue and the 
question that I set out to explore was: ‘How did the Indonesian and South Korean political 
systems incorporate popular support and interest articulation so as to successfully implement 
reforms?’  My empirical finding in relation to this question was that state corporatism in 
Indonesia proved an effective political structure as long as the reforms that were implemented 
were in accordance with the political elites’ interests. My analysis shows that the Indonesian 
institutional structure of state corporatism did not allow any collective action by the business 
community, nor did any other social group have any noteworthy influence in the economic 
policy-making process. This lack of institutionalised opposition enabled the government to 
hinder the implementation of IMF reforms without any noteworthy opposition. This indicates 
that the repressive political institutional structure of state corporatism in Indonesia has made 
the state autonomous against collective action, but still responsive to particular interests of the 
political elite because of its clientelistic structure. In contrast to the Indonesian experience the 
South Korean case shows how a somewhat more societal oriented corporatism proved to be 
an advantage in the implementation of IMF reforms. As seen during the tripartite 
negotiations, societal corporatism in South Korea opened up for the ability of the affected 
groups, such as organised labour, to bargain with the government. In return for labour unions’ 
support the government gave compensations to the groups affected by the reforms, which 
enhanced the legitimacy and the support of the government’s implementation. This can 
indicate that a government relying on labour support is in a better position to implement 
economic reforms than a government that would have based its support on the business 
sector. Due to president Kim Dae Jung’s background as an opposition politician that had 
challenged the position of the powerful Chaebols, labour groups to a larger degree accepted 
the reforms because they didn’t think that Kim Dae Jung would ‘fool’ them for the benefit of 
the Chaebols. Thus Kim Dae Jung did not have to face opposition from distrustful labour 
unions, which gave him greater leeway in implementing IMF reforms and especially the 
reforms that aimed at increasing the ‘flexibility of the workforce’.  
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The theoretical perspective of regime capacity has proven fruitful in this thesis as it has drawn 
the attention to how formal political institutions have influenced the behaviour of 
governments. The approach of regime capacity underlines the main argument made in this 
thesis, that in order to understand the politics of economic reform implementation it is 
important to explore how political institutions and political processes promote a special kind 
of economic development.  
7.2 How do governments handle demands from the IMF to implement economic 
reforms? 
Apart from just exploring how national political factors influenced the implementation of the 
IMF reforms, an important part of the model that I developed focused on the context where 
the interplay between IMF and the recipient governments took place. In chapter 4 I sought to 
examine: ‘How did conflict and cooperation between the IMF and the recipient government 
concerning the properness of economic reforms manifest itself in the implementation 
process?’ My empirical findings indicate that this was an important question in at least in two 
respects: First, that a part of the successful implementation of IMF reforms in South Korea 
seemed to rely on a common understanding between the IMF and Kim Dae Jung about the 
causes of the crisis and the required economic reforms. On the other hand, in Indonesia, 
Suharto’s understanding of the crisis and the needed reforms were not similar to IMF’s, and it 
became a hinder to the further implementation. Second, the Indonesian case shows that 
without some kind of alliance between the IMF and domestic political agents, such as 
government members, technocrats, business interests and other powerful groups, the 
implementation process becomes difficult.  
 
It seems obvious that a discussion of IMF’s role in the Asian economic crisis implies a 
broader discussion about the future role of the IMF. According to my empirical findings the 
IMF stands out as an actor that has increased its role as a global political and economic actor 
during 1997-98. The Fund has to a larger extent become politicised through its demands of 
massive liberalisation of the Asian economies, as well as its focus on the implementation of 
economic and structural reforms aimed at developing ‘good governance’. Implicit in IMF’s 
technical rhetoric was the contention that Asian economic growth was based on crony 
capitalism with a corrupt preferential lending system. As the Asian crisis erupted, the 
mainstream view was that the only viable alternative for restoring the Asian economies, and 
for further economic growth was adherence to liberalist oriented economic ideology, as 
preferred by the IMF and the USA. As my analysis discusses, the IMF was not considered in 
Indonesia and to some degree in South Korea as an independent international financial 
institution providing ‘objective’ macroeconomic assistance in a time of crisis. The IMF  was 
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rather perceived as a western institution imposing a western liberal ideology ‘disguised’ as 
economic assistance.  
 
The aim of this thesis has not been to develop or test any general theory, but rather to design 
an analytical model that could help to explore the complex issue of the politics of economic 
reform implementation. The model developed in this thesis is made up of four national 
political factors interpreted in the context of the interplay between the IMF and the recipient 
governments. The model has been useful as this thesis clearly shows that in order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the politics of economic reform implementation it is 
necessary to conduct a complex analysis of the national and international political factors 
involved. And although my model has shed some light on the complicated interplay of the 
political factors at stake, one is still far from developing a general theory of the politics of 
economic reform implementation. 
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